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Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Gregorio Impavido 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》1998,69(2):243-260
I develop a model of credit rationing with effort unobservable by lenders where borrowers can choose among projects of different riskiness. In such a set-up rationing that can be relaxed if borrowers put up physical collateral arises. Group lending proves to be a possible means to relax rationing and improve efficiency when physical collateral is not available. The optimal size of groups is here analysed as a function of social factors. It turns out that groups can be neither too small nor too large because in both cases the effectiveness of social sanctions on behaviour is too low to offset the negative effect on effort due to profit sharing and free riding. Individual sensitivity to social sanctions is the crucial element determining whether groups can be formed or not. 相似文献
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MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies - 相似文献
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