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We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current
one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve
up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects
and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples
that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding
which increases their realized payoffs. (JEL C9 D4 D8)
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
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JEL Classification C93, D44, D83 相似文献
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Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the auctions. The results show a strong impact on auction choice. Subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often. The number of bidders in each auction, revenue, efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized. 相似文献
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