中国汽车工业供应链管理的现状与发展对策研究

总结了国际汽车工业供应链管理的基本原理和发展态势,以中国三大汽车公司为对象,客观地从多个侧面分析了发展中国汽车工业供应链面临的主要问题,提出了我国汽车工业供应链的一系列发展对策。     

中国城镇不同所有制企业职工收入差距的变化趋势

本文利用最新发布的CHIP-2007和CHIP-2002分析了2002年到2007年中国城镇不同所有制企业职工收入差距的变化趋势。我们发现这段时期不同所有制企业的收入差距正在减小,且这种收敛的趋势更有利于非国有企业职工,这与1995年到2002年的变化趋势形成鲜明对比。当我们分解收入差距时,发现个体的特征或能力的差别对于解释收入差距的重要性在显著提高。此外,市场分割对于不同所有制的企业仍然存在,特别对于高收入群体,但有逐步缩小的趋势。     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

最低工资提高会增加农民工收入吗?

随着农民进城务工数量的持续增加,收入不平等的加剧和最低工资标准的显著提高,最低工资的作用和影响再次引起了社会的广泛关注。本文通过应用大规模的流动人口监测数据库和一些宏观数据,分析了最低工资标准的提高对流动人口就业、工作时间和工资的影响。结果显示,最低工资标准的提高对就业仅有微弱的影响,仅对女性和中部农民工的负面影响显著。但最低工资标准提高后,会显著增加男性及非国有企业农民工的工作时间。     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.     

Stock Market Volatility and Learning

We show that consumption‐based asset pricing models with time‐separable preferences generate realistic amounts of stock price volatility if one allows for small deviations from rational expectations. Rational investors with subjective beliefs about price behavior optimally learn from past price observations. This imparts momentum and mean reversion into stock prices. The model quantitatively accounts for the volatility of returns, the volatility and persistence of the price‐dividend ratio, and the predictability of long‐horizon returns. It passes a formal statistical test for the overall fit of a set of moments provided one excludes the equity premium.     

ON THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTION

Disasters are often precipitated by insufficient preventive care. We argue that there is a problem of prevention in that this lack of care often stems from agents’ rational calculations. Positive experiences lead agents to underestimate the risks of disasters; technological improvements and redundancies designed for safety induce agents to reduce their care. Although lower care increases the chances of an accident, the number of redundancies can be adjusted to offset this. However, the accident probability remains constant even as ostensible improvements in safety are made. Checklists can be used to decrease the number of accidents.     

Competition from Specialized Firms and the Diversification–Performance Linkage

In this study, we show that the effect of diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries and explore analytically and empirically the implications of this finding for the diversification literature. Diversified firms perform better in industries with a small number of nondiversified competitors or, equivalently, when specialized firms have a small combined market share, but worse as the presence of specialized firms increases in the industries in which they compete. The results are robust to the use of methods that alleviate the self‐selection problem and call for a reassessment of the diversification–performance relationship.     

Explaining contract choice: vertical coordination,sharecropping, and wine in Europe, 1850–19501

Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems associated with moral hazard in cultivation (in Tuscany), or providing a crucial ‘rung’ on the farm ladder (in the US south). Yet despite these and other important features, sharecropping was surprisingly absent in most regions. Using case studies associated with French wine production, this article argues that a number of factors have often been overlooked in the literature, the first of which is the need for landowners to be able to offer farms that were sufficiently large both to employ the sharecropper's family on a full‐time basis, and to allow them to produce a variety of products to minimize risk. Second, measurement problems exist with the division of the harvest, especially when quality was an important factor in determining price. Finally, the nature of vertical cooperation and integration associated with the production and marketing arrangements of individual crops suggests that landowners were not indifferent to receiving payment in cash or kind, and this affected contract choice. This article incorporates these ideas to explain not just the presence and absence of sharecropping in different geographical localities, but also the wide variety of different forms of the contract that existed in France.     

OUTPUT‐EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE*

Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite‐horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative to the non‐collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities. We also find that the time at which maximal collusion is most difficult to sustain can be either at booms or recessions. The international copper cartel of 1935–39 is used to illustrate some of our results.