Raise Rates to Raise Inflation? Neo‐Fisherianism in the New Keynesian Model

Increasing the inflation target in a New Keynesian (NK) model may require increasing, rather than decreasing, the nominal interest rate in the short run. We refer to this positive short‐run comovement between the nominal rates and inflation conditional on a nominal shock as Neo‐Fisherianism. We show that the NK model is more likely to be Neo‐Fisherian the more persistent is the change in the inflation target and the more flexible are prices. Neo‐Fisherianism is driven by the forward‐looking nature of the model. Modifications that make the framework less forward‐looking make it less likely for the model to exhibit Neo‐Fisherianism.     

The Persistence of Inflation Versus That of Real Marginal Cost in the New Keynesian Model

This note provides an example where the New Keynesian Phillips Curve leads inflation to be substantially more persistent than the output gap.     

Bargaining over Public Goods

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.     

Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles

We document cycles in corporate investment corresponding with the timing of national elections around the world. During election years, firms reduce investment expenditures by an average of 4.8% relative to nonelection years, controlling for growth opportunities and economic conditions. The magnitude of the investment cycles varies with different country and election characteristics. We investigate several potential explanations and find evidence supporting the hypothesis that political uncertainty leads firms to reduce investment expenditures until the electoral uncertainty is resolved. These findings suggest that political uncertainty is an important channel through which the political process affects real economic outcomes.     

Minimal Settlement Assets in Economies with Interconnected Financial Obligations

A model is developed where firms belonging to a group are obliged to make payments to one another by using a liquid asset. The paper studies the exogenous endowments of this asset that are necessary to assure that all obligations are met. Conditions are presented under which the degree to which firms are interconnected (so that each creditor has more debtors and each debtor has more creditors) increases the number of firms that must be endowed with the liquid asset. Interconnectedness then makes payment defaults more likely. By acquiring too many payment obligations, firms may also become too interconnected.     

COMMUNITY HOMOGENEITY AND REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS

This paper examines the links between community homogeneity and the demand for environmental quality. Using data from California, this paper shows that communities that are more homogeneous in terms of race and educational attainment are more likely to support the public provision of environmental goods, after controlling for political ideology, voter turnout, and the distribution of benefits and costs across communities. The models also reveal nonmonotonic relationships between racial and social groups and support for the public provision of environmental amenities. Support for environmental initiatives in a community typically increases at an increasing rate the greater the concentration of Whites. On the other hand, support generally increases at a decreasing rate the greater the share of African Americans and Asians in the population. Results for a proposal that would have imposed a tax on oil extraction to fund alternative energy projects suggest a different pattern of nonlinear associations. (JEL D72, H42, Q51, Q58)     

Implementing Steady State Efficiency in Overlapping Generations Economies with Environmental Externalities

We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pollution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from the social planner's viewpoint. We show that the dynamical inefficiency of a competitive equilibrium steady state with capital–labor ratio exceeding the golden rule ratio still holds. Moreover, the range of dynamically efficient steady state capital ratios increases with the effectiveness of the environment maintenance technology, and decreases for more polluting production technologies. We characterize some tax and transfer policies that decentralize as a competitive equilibrium outcome the transition to the social planner's steady state.