Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Cultural Economy of Cities

An increasingly important fraction of contemporary economic activity is devoted to the production of cultural outputs, i.e. goods and services with high levels of aesthetic or semiotic content. This kind of economic activity is especially, and increasingly, associated with a number of large cities scattered over the globe. A conceptual account of this phenomenon is provided on the basis of an exploration of the character of place-specific forms of culture generation and the agglomerative tendencies of many kinds of cultural products industries. The empirical cases of Los Angeles and Paris are briefly discussed. The dynamics of production, distribution and location of major cultural products industries are also examined. The paper ends with a brief allusion to the modalities of spatial differentiation of culture in contemporary capitalism and to a prospective cultural politics.     

Optimal investment with fixed financing costs

Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Events in the Gulf have finally brought an end to the world economic boom of the last eight years. The oil price shock itself is only partly responsible for the downturn. The previous tightening of monetary policy in the face of inflationary pressures and the end of a rapid period of credit and asset price expansion had severely weakened the ability of some economies to respond to the shock. This is reflected in the diversity of response, most obviously in the United States where Fed fine tuning and the credit crunch have already weakened the economy. The rise in oil prices has led to a sudden collapse in consumer confidence and a swift cutback in output. Although we do not expect the recession to be deep, the financial problems will delay recovery. The Japanese economy was already in financial difficulties before the shock, although the real economy was stronger and here we expect a sharp deceleration from almost 6 per cent growth last year to around 3.5 per cent. In contrast the German economy, partly shielded by the substantial appreciation of the DM over the last year, has been affected less by the oil price shock and we expect the consumer and investment boom to continue this year as the economies merge. This provides a welcome boost to other European economies.     

Risk and the miller equilibrium: Capital structure choice with risk-averse investors

Merton Miller's (1977) tax model of equilibrium capital structure choice results in capital structure irrelevance and the existence of tax clienteles, assuming the restrictive case of risk-neutrality. Relaxation of the assumption of risk-neutrality in Miller's tax framework, allowing utility-maximizing risk-averse investors, indicates that capital structure irrelevance continues to hold under reasonable assumptions about utility. Evaluation of resulting tax clienteles shows that marginal tax rates do not restrict investors from investing in equities but do affect the tax status of purchased bonds.     

Auditor conservatism and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from the Year 2000 systems issue

This study further examines the phenomenon of conservative auditor behaviour by considering the level of voluntary disclosure of Year 2000 remediation information in company annual reports. Previous studies have provided evidence of conservative auditor behaviour by examining the link between Big 6 auditor choice and accruals (Francis and Krishnan 1999; Becker et al ., 1998; Defond and Subramanyam 1998). Protecting their reputation capital increases Big 6 auditor incentives to act conservatively to avoid litigation risk. We propose and find that Big 6 auditor clients disclose more Year 2000 remediation information than non–Big 6 auditor clients.     

A Formula for Success? Training,Reward and Commitment in a Chemicals Plant

Managerial strategies designed to elicit greater employee commitment in production have received much attention in recent industrial relations reseach. Training is seen to form a core component of such strategies, yielding such beneficial outcomes as improved efficiency and employee motivation. Yet the connections between training strategy and performance outcomes have been treated in an overly simplistic fashion. This in turn reflects a lack of empirical inquiry at the level of the shop-floor currently to be found in the subject area. By integrating an investigation of the workplace into the analysis of management strategy and performance outcomes, it is possible to develop a deeper understanding of the linkages between training provision, commitment and systems of reward.     

Risk Management Using Quasi–static Hedging

In this paper, we try to develop a comprehensive theory of risk management for illiquid trading instruments and exotics by examining the consequences of a quasi–static hedging strategy. In contrast to a static hedging strategy, in which an initial hedge once executed is kept in place for the life of the trade, and a dynamic hedging strategy, in which hedges are frequently adjusted over the life of the trade, a quasi–static hedging strategy utilizes hedge adjustments but tries to minimize the frequency. Almost all the examples studied in the framework introduced here take this minimization to the extreme by limiting hedge adjustments to at most one during the life of a trade. We examine the application of this approach to long–dated forwards, long–dated options and exotic options such as cliquet and barriers. The model we present for barriers is a new generation of the Derman–Ergener–Kani approach which combines the flexibility of the approach with a sizable increase in model independence.