Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

Price Competition When Consumersare Uncertain About Which Firm Sells Which Quality

In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms.     

VARIANCE BOUND TESTS OF BOND MARKET EFFICIENCY

In this paper we examine variance bound tests of the joint hypothesis that (1) bond markets are efficient and (2) the term structure is determined by the expectations hypothesis. Both the Singleton and Shiller tests are shown to be seriously biased toward rejecting the joint hypothesis in finite samples. Flavin's test is unbiased but has a very high variance leading to many false rejections of the joint hypothesis. When corrected as suggested by Flavin, Shiller's test is unbiased and has a relatively low variance. Unfortunately, it is also sensitive to measurement error.     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

Opportunistic tendencies in IJVS with the Japanese: The effects of culture,shared decision making,and relationship age

This study investigated how partners' self-reported opportunism and shared decision making varied by culture in international joint ventures (IJVs) with the Japanese. Data were gathered by a mail survey of senior officials in IJVs located in 11 host countries. Significant differences were found between partners from Western cultures and the Japanese, but not between other Asians and the Japanese. Indirect effects suggest that shared decision making neutralizes cultural tendencies toward opportunism. Results indicated that opportunistic tendencies did not diminish as the IJV relationship aged, and that shared decision making did diminish as the relationship aged.     

New Evidence on the Performance Advantages of Multihospital Systems

This study analyzes the performance effects of proprietary, multihospital systems. It is shown that the organizational structure of these systems may affect the operating costs of member hospitals. Estimating a cost function for Florida hospitals and controlling for other factors, the average costs of HUMANA hospitals are empirically about 17 percent lower, while the costs of other leading chains are about 12 percent lower than not-for-profit institutions. These results contrast with earlier studies that found no such differences. Furthermore, the cost differential that exists between system and non-system hospitals can be largely attributed to technical efficiencies arising from chain ownership.     

Market efficiency and cointegration: Some evidence in Pacific-Basin black exchange markets

This paper investigates the efficiency of the black exchange markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The study applies unit root and cointegration tests to examine black exchange market efficiency of Pacific-Basin countries. The generating process of black exchange rates appears to be a random walk. This is consistent with Gupta (1981) and other foreign exchange rate unit root test studies. Johansen cointegration tests are performed for these black exchange markets together with Japan and Singapore. The results suggest that there is at least one unit root among the black market exchange rates. Hence, black exchange markets are not collectively efficient.     

Trust,terrorism, and technology

The development of civilization implies an evolution of complex trust mechanisms which integrate the social system and form bonds which allow individuals to interact, even if they are strangers. Key elements of trust are predictability of consequences and an evaluation of consequences in terms of self-interest or values. Values, ethics, and norms enhance predictability. The terrorist introduces an unpredictable event which has negative consequences, thus destroying trust. However, terrorist-like situations occur in day-to-day activities. Technology itself makes the world more interdependent and less predictable. Furthermore, technological accidents and disasters, which are also unpredictable and negative, may prompt individuals to perceive technology as if it were a terrorist. Louis H. Bluhm is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Mississippi State University. He has written several articles which have been published in Rural Sociology, and with P. M. Shingi he has written a chapter in a book.