An empirical analysis of euro cash payments

If the denominational structure of the euro is used in an optimal way, there should be no preferences for certain coins and notes when making cash payments. In Kippers et al. [2003. An empirical study of cash payments. Statistica Neerlandica 57, 484-508] it is documented that the Dutch public did have certain preferences concerning the Dutch guilder in the sense that a few notes and coins were used less often than they should have been. With the advent of the euro, which changed the denominational structure from 1--5 (guilder) to 1-2-5 (euro), it is of interest to examine whether there are any preferences for euro coins and notes. In this paper we use a unique dataset for the Netherlands to empirically examine if the euro range is used in an optimal way. We find that there are no preferences for certain euro denominations.     

Desire to be ethical or ability to self‐control: Which is more crucial for ethical behavior?

Promoting ethical decisions and behaviors is challenging for any organization. Yet managers are still required to make ethical decisions under conditions which deplete their self‐control resources, such as high stress and long hours. This study examines the relationships among symbolic and internal moral identity, self‐control, and ethical behavior, and investigates whether self‐control acts as the mechanism through which moral identity leads to ethical behavior. Findings indicate that internal moral identity overrides symbolic moral identity in the relationship with self‐control and that self‐control fully mediates the relationship between internal moral identity and ethical behavior. The implications for organizations is that while rules, procedures, and ethics training are useful, managers with a strong moral compass will be more likely to practice self‐control leading to more ethical behaviors.     

A rose by any other name …: Color‐naming influences on decision making

Companies dealing in colors (e.g., paint companies, the cosmetic industry) spend enormous amounts of time and money selecting names to accompany their various product lines in an attempt to maximally appeal to and lure in consumers. In two experiments, the current research examines the extent to which such naming strategies have an impact on consumer behavior. Across both experiments, participants rated either color swatches (Experiment 1) or products (Experiment 2) that had either generic names (e.g., brown) or fancy names (e.g., mocha) attached to them. The results of each experiment revealed that names significantly influence how colors are perceived, and that fancy names result in significantly more favorable ratings than do generic names. Both theoretical and applied implications of this phenomenon are discussed. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Strategic consensus mapping: A new method for testing and visualizing strategic consensus within and between teams

Research on strategic consensus focuses primarily on the extent of agreement among team members regarding organizational strategy. It does not include elements such as the content of the agreement, between‐group consensus, or the significance of differences in consensus (e.g., for evaluating the effectiveness of strategic interventions). We propose a new analytical approach, Strategic Consensus Mapping, that provides a comprehensive analysis of strategic consensus within and between groups and that includes intuitive and easy‐to‐understand visualizations. This approach offers researchers the necessary tools for integrative theory building in strategic consensus, as well as in the broader managerial and organizational cognition domain. Using a case example, we illustrate the proposed methods for a multidimensional, multilevel, and longitudinal analysis of strategic consensus. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimating the Impact of Displays and Other Merchandising Support on Retail Brand Sales: Partial Pooling with Examples

With the advent of scanning data, methodological issues have arisen, in particular as they relate to the reliability of parameter estimates in regression models. This study deals with the reliability of the coefficients of promotion-type dummy variables (e.g., display, leaflet, bonus pack,). Due to a lack of passthrough of trade deals to the end consumer, those coefficients can be typically unidentified or unstable when estimated at the store level and even at the chain level. Assuming that the individual-level coefficients of the dummy variables are draws from a common but arbitrary distribution, the authors suggest to "pool" the data for those variables (partial "pooling") across stores and across chains. They show with three real-life examples the increased reliability (with a correct sign) of the "pooled" coefficients as compared with the store-level or chain-level individual coefficients.     

Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

Linking reputations through umbrella branding

This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. The analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot certify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already sell a high (low) quality product have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new entrants.