Falling through the cracks: International accounting rate reform at the ITU and WTO

Heightened attention to international accounting rates at the ITU and the WTO has led some observers to conclude that carriers soon will impose cost-based termination charges. This article concludes that while accounting rates have declined on some routes, many incumbent carriers can and will delay or thwart progress. The article examines the FCC's unilateral regulatory initiative as evidence of a growing schism between governments keen on immediate progress and those that fear a ‘free fall’ in accounting rates and a quick end to settlement surpluses. The article also considers technological innovations like call-back and Internet telephony with an eye toward assesssing whether and how widespread accounting rate reductions will occur.     

Merging Markets

We study the causes and effects of the competition for order flow by U.S. regional stock exchanges. We trace the origins of competition for order flow to a change in the role of regional exchanges from being venues for listing local securities to being more direct competitors for the order flow of NYSE listings. We study the way regionals competed for order flow, concentrating on a series of stock-exchange mergers that occurred in the midst of this transition of the regional exchanges. The merging exchanges attracted market share and experienced narrower bid-ask spreads.     

Effects of securities deregulation in underwriting: An Analysis of SEC Rule 415

In this paper we present evidence on the effects of Rule 415, the SEC Rule that relaxed the SEC's long-standing opposition to delayed offerings. Shelf registration allows securities to be offered on a continuous or delayed basis in certain circumstances. We provide evidence on one aspect of the controversy surrounding Rule 415's adoption: the effect of shelf registration on the distribution of underwriting revenues among broker/dealers. We find on average all broker/dealers experienced an increase in underwriting revenues following the adoption of shelf registration due to an increase in total business financing. However, we find that the largest underwriters experienced an increase in underwriting revenues relative to total business financing. The relationship for smaller broker/dealers between underwriting revenues and total business financing did not change significantly after the adoption of shelf registration. Thus, shelf registration appears not do have harmed small broker/dealers.     

Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?

We examine the relation between a firm’s campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures and its Tobin’s q. We follow other studies that use q to measure the value of the firm’s intangible capital (e.g., the value of advertising, R&D, or environmental performance). Researchers have found a positive and significant relation between intangible assets and q. If political capital exists, it is an intangible asset. However, we find little relation between q and political contributions, suggesting that campaign contributions may not have long term effects on political markets. This is consistent with the view that contributions are done by firms as a response to a short term opportunity not as a way of building long-term political capital.

Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance

We use a well-developed dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to alleviate endogeneity concerns in two aspects of corporate governance research: the effect of board structure on firm performance and the determinants of board structure. The estimator incorporates the dynamic nature of internal governance choices to provide valid and powerful instruments that address unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. We re-examine the relation between board structure and performance using the GMM estimator in a panel of 6,000 firms over a period from 1991 to 2003, and find no causal relation between board structure and current firm performance. We illustrate why other commonly used estimators that ignore the dynamic relationship between current governance and past firm performance may be biased. We discuss where it may be appropriate to consider the dynamic panel GMM estimator in corporate governance research, as well as caveats to its use.     

The political reception of innovations

Why do some societies embrace innovative technologies, policies, and ideas, while others are slow to adopt, and some even resist, them? Incumbent producers are most likely to be affected by certain kinds of innovations; they also wield a disproportionate influence in the design of institutions and policies that encourage or limit their adoption. We show formally that the elite has four cardinal policy options: to appropriate the innovation for itself; to encourage its adoption; to tax, regulate, or limit the innovation; or to block it. We show that six features of an innovation determine how it is received: (i) whether it is easy to replicate; (ii) whether it complements or competes with the elite's sources of income; (iii) whether its impact is broad or narrow; (iv) whether it is location-dependent, and (v) concealable; (vi) whether it requires large fixed costs. While other works have occasionally considered one of these factors, we show where each feature comes from, and we assess them systematically and together. We provide illustrative evidence of the relevance and generality of the model to understand the fate of a variety of innovations.     

Policy Responses to Balance-of-Payments Crises: The Role of Elections

Governments have a number of policy tools that can be used to address pressure on the balance of payments, threatening an undesirable decline in the relative value of the national currency. They can: (1) sell reserves, (2) raise interest rates, (3) impose capital controls, (4) apply trade restrictions, or (5) depreciate the currency. While researchers typically analyze these policies in isolation from one another, we treat them as a menu of options available to election-minded politicians. We analyze the use of these five policy responses to payments difficulties for a large sample of countries since the early 1970s. We argue that governments try to minimize political costs by adopting less transparent policies first and only moving to more visible policies as necessary, delaying the most visible and politically costly policies until after elections. The evidence is consistent with these claims: governments are more likely to draw down reserves and impose capital controls before other options. If these policies do not succeed, they tend to raise interest rates. If further action is needed, they delay devaluations and trade protection until after elections.     

The determinants of board structure

Using a comprehensive sample of nearly 7,000 firms from 1990 to 2004, we examine the corporate board structure, trends, and determinants. Guided by recent theoretical work, we find that board structure across firms is consistent with the costs and benefits of the board's monitoring and advising roles. Our models explain as much as 45% of the observed variation in board structure. Further, small and large firms have dramatically different board structures. For example, board size fell in the 1990s for large firms, a trend that reversed at the time of mandated reforms, while board size was relatively flat for small and medium-sized firms.