Teams,Teamwork and Absence*

We argue that firms with interdependent worker productivity, team production, have a higher cost of absence and, as a consequence, spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates. We estimate the determinants of absence for blue‐collar workers using a sample of German manufacturing establishments. Workplace teams are used as a proxy for team production. The estimates reveal that firms with teams have lower absence rates, as do smaller establishments. The size effect, however, is unique to establishments with teams, which fits prior theoretical work that has not been previously tested.     

Do Spillovers Stimulate Incremental or Drastic Product Innovations? Evidence from German Establishment Data*

Despite the generally recognized importance of knowledge spillovers, the empirical literature is essentially silent on the type of innovation stimulated by spillovers. We estimate the determinants of product innovations differing in their degree of newness to the adopting firm. Knowledge spillovers from rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations. This impact is largely independent of participation in R&D cooperation. Spillovers exert no such independent influence on drastic innovation activities. The results support the hypothesis that establishments face difficulties in using knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. Establishments exploit spillovers for incremental innovations rather than for drastic innovations. To some degree R&D cooperation can help to overcome the difficulties in using spillovers for drastic innovations. Furthermore, our estimates provide evidence that the firm's own R&D effort and the use of outside information are substitutes.     

The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data

Using Dutch data, we examine the characteristics of establishments that operate performance appraisal systems. Our estimates provide a couple of interesting results: (1) Multitasking and teamwork play a role in the use of performance appraisal systems. (2) While a shared corporate culture, the sharing of information, and a professional personnel management emerge as positive determinants, unions appear to play a negative role. (3) Employers fostering career development and promotion opportunities make greater use of performance appraisal. (4) Public sector affiliation plays a negative role.     

A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal–Agent Theory

Why are principal–agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an evaluation of the agent's input, while the incentives analysed in principal–agent models rely on the agent's output. The choice between the two incentive schemes depends on the probability that the agent is caught shirking. Moreover, we demonstrate that a combination of input‐ and output‐related elements provides stronger incentives than payment schemes based on merely one of these elements. However, the combination requires a more complex labour contract involving an increased cost of writing the contract. The interaction between this transaction cost and a hiring cost is analysed.     

Profit sharing and firm size: The role of team production

This paper presents a model showing that profit sharing is subject to the 1/N problem in the case of independent worker productivity but not in the case of interdependent worker productivity. This implies the role of firm size on the likelihood of profit sharing will differ by the nature of the underlying technology. We test this implication using German establishment data and using a proxy for interdependent worker productivity. The results conform to the theory showing that firm size is associated with reduced profit sharing use when technology is independent but not when technology is interdependent.     

TEAMWORK AND INTRA‐FIRM WAGE DISPERSION AMONG BLUE‐COLLAR WORKERS

Using data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, we find that the use of self‐managed teams is associated with increased intra‐firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue‐collar workers. We also show that moderating factors play an important role. While teamwork interacts positively with employer‐provided further training and a production technology of the most recent vintage, it interacts negatively with the age of the establishment and the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement.     

The Introduction of Works Councils in German Establishments — Rent Seeking or Rent Protection?

Some recent empirical studies seem to suggest that German works councils engage in rent-seeking activities rather than in the creation of joint establishment surplus. However, those cross-sectional studies do not address the issue of causation. We address this issue by investigating the factors that influence the employees' decision to introduce a works council in their establishment. Councils are more likely to be adopted in establishments with a very poor sales situation and poor employment growth. They are also more likely to be adopted in establishments where management does not pursue an expansive market strategy. Altogether, our results support the hypothesis that employees introduce works councils to protect the quasi-rents they have created by their efforts and human capital investments.     

Variable Pay,Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit‐sharing and employee share ownership than those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an increased probability of using each of the three practices when under domestic ownership but not when under foreign ownership. These results inform the ongoing debate over institutional duality, the extent to which foreign firms adopt uniform practices independent of local institutions, and the extent to which they adapt and participate in those local institutions.     

Which employers regard the threat of dismissal as a suitable incentive to motivate workers?

Using German establishment data, this study finds that the share of blue-collar workers, an outdated production technology and a high-wage policy increase the probability that employers regard the threat of dismissal as a suitable incentive. A participatory human resource management policy, the incidence of a works council and difficulties in filling vacancies decrease the probability.     

The adoption and termination of profit sharing for employees: does management’s attitude play a role?

Examinations on the determinants of profit sharing usually focus on objective firm characteristics. Using data from manufacturing firms in Germany, this study shows that managers’ subjective attitudes towards profit sharing also play an important role in the adoption and termination of this payment scheme. Positive management attitudes are associated with an increased likelihood of adopting profit sharing. While to some extent this entails failed experimentation, positive managerial attitudes also substantially contribute to a sustained use of profit sharing. The pattern of results holds even when controlling for a variety of objective firm characteristics.