The social process of internet appropriation: Living in a digitally advanced country benefits less well-educated Europeans

We generalize and extend the sequential model proposed by the resources and appropriation theory to explain the digital divide in the European Union plus the United Kingdom (EU27+UK). We measure the theoretical constructs of the model with data provided by the EU and test the theoretical predictions using a partial least squares structural equation model. We find support for the hypothesized relationships but find that the effects vary depending on the digital development level of countries. While education overall is the primary determinant of the social production of digital inequalities, a country's digital development level is crucial for less well-educated Europeans. These findings have theoretical and practical implications: (1) they call into question the homogeneity of the effect of causal relationships and the assumption that individuals differ only in terms of motivation, access, and digital skills, and (2) they indicate that socially disadvantaged Europeans benefit from living in more digitally developed countries.     

How Does Probability of Innovation Change with Firm Age?

This paper looks at the probability of introducing innovations by manufacturing firms at different stages of their lives. Once differences related to activity and size are controlled for, we examine how the probability of innovation varies over entry, post-entry ages, and advanced ages of mature firms. We also measure the association between exit from the market and pre-exit innovation. Results show that the probability of innovating widely varies by activity, and that small size per se broadly reduces the probability of innovation, but also that entrant firms tend to present the highest probability of innovation while the oldest firms tend to show lower innovative probabilities. Some sets of firms with intermediate ages also present a high probability of innovation, and exiting firms are clearly associated to lower levels of introducing process innovations.     

A note on the decomposition (at a point) of aggregate excess demand on the Grassmannian

This paper analyzes the properties of aggregate excess demand functions for economies with an arbitrary finite set of N commodities where agents face trading restrictions of a general, abstract form: their budget set is defined by K-dimensional planes in ^N. It is shown that, if there are at least K agents in the economy, the only general property satisfied by the value of aggregate excess demand and its derivative, at any arbitrary point, is Walras Law. The result is established by considering an economy where agents' preferences are of a ‘generalized Leontief' type.     

A refinement of the core equivalence theorem

It is known that if blocking coalitions are restricted to be small relative to the size of the economy then the approximation of core allocations by competitive allocations can still be assured. This paper proves that the same type of approximation result is valid if the absolute size of the blocking coalition is bounded. The methods of Anderson (1978) are applied.     

Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy

We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap. We use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inflation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules.     

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study

Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and (3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full feedback. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52     

Robustness of the estimates of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve

Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric approach. Journal of Monetary Eonomics 44(2), 195-222] developed a hybrid variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates inflation to real marginal cost, expected future inflation and lagged inflation. GMM estimates of the model suggest that forward-looking behavior is dominant: the coefficient on expected future inflation substantially exceeds the coefficient on lagged inflation. While the latter differs significantly from zero, it is quantitatively modest. Several authors have suggested that our results are the product of specification bias or suspect estimation methods. Here we show that these claims are incorrect, and that our results are robust to a variety of estimation procedures, including GMM estimation of the closed form, and nonlinear instrumental variables. Also, as we discuss, many others have obtained very similar results to ours using a systems approach, including FIML techniques. Hence, the conclusions of GG and others regarding the importance of forward-looking behavior remain robust.     

Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement

This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement. The model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets.