Vertical Restraints and Market Access

This paper analyzes vertical restraints in relation to market access issues. In Section II we briefly review the recent three major trade conflicts between Japan and the USA in light of vertical restraints. In Section III we review the major policy lessons of the economics literature of vertical restraints, and analyze whether we need a special treatment for vertical restraints abroad for a market access reason. In Section IV we evaluate the policy options towards foreign foreclosure and suggest that nondiscriminatory application of foreign or home competition policy should be the mechanism to address such concern instead of trade policy actions such as voluntary import expansions.     

Price Effects on Compound Commodities

We examine the effect of simultaneous price changes on the total demand for a group of goods, which we call a compound commodity. Specifically, we consider unit and proportional cost components (e.g., taxes, transportation costs) imposed on compound commodities. If the unit cost is positive, then the proportional cost raises the relative price of the more expensive good, and thus induces substitution towards the less expensive good within this group. Then, the substitution effect of the proportional cost for a compound commodity is non‐negative if and only if the compound commodity and the other goods are, on average, not strongly substitutable.     

The designing of corporate accounting law in Japan after the Second World War

After the Second World War, during the neutralization of the controlled economy of wartime Japan, a design for a Corporate Accounting Law was elaborated by the Investigation Committee on the Business Accounting System. The Investigation Committee tried to establish not only new business accounting standards but also a central and independent administrative organ of corporate accounting regulation on the basis of the Corporate Accounting Law. The Corporate Accounting Law was expected to lay the legal foundation of the new corporate accounting regulation regime in Japan. Nevertheless, even though the original design of the fundamental accounting law was never realized, it should be considered the starting point for our understanding of external accounting history in post-war Japan.     

Competition and termination of the alliances between asymmetric partners: The case of Japanese department stores

To enrich the literature on alliance termination, we recognize that the dynamics of individual alliances are subject to the structural characteristics of the alliance portfolios in which they are embedded. We anchor our study in the context of large industry leaders partnering with multiple small partners, the latter of which can be viewed as competing for access to the formers’ resources. We expect that a small partner’s relative capability in relation to peer partners within a leader’s alliance portfolio is negatively related to the likelihood of alliance termination, since the leader acknowledges that partners with inferior capability do not deserve to be supported. Furthermore, this relationship would be moderated by alliance portfolio size, market overlap with peer partners, and with industry leaders. Using a unique dataset of 145 alliances between leading and small department stores in Japan in the period 1977-93, we found general support for the hypothesized relationships.     

Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms

We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. It is affected by the number of the firms and asymmetry among the sizes of the firms; the smaller the number of firms and the more asymmetry among firms, the higher the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggested that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms, and thus, decreases with the market competition index, assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation to discuss asymmetry among private firms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monotonically increasing, and thus never monotonically decreasing, in asymmetry among private firms.     

Geography and Demography: New Economic Geography With Endogenous Fertility

To explain the links between demographics and economic integration, we construct a new economic geography model with endogenous fertility. Labour mobility across regions results in more people flowing into highly populated regions, but lowers fertility rates there. Finally, regions are divided into one very large region with a higher real wage and another small region with a lower real wage, a higher fertility rate and a supply of workers to the large region. The population growth path resembles a logistic curve in the early phase, but population decreases in the last phase. Economic integration leads to population concentration and decreases population size.     

Contribution-proportional remuneration rule for employee inventions and its effects on effort and investment incentives

The practice of the Japanese court in case of a dispute between the employer and employee regarding the amount of remuneration for an employee invention has been to order that the additional profit from the invention be divided proportionally to their respective input contributions. We show that, if the employer’s investment and employee’s effort are weakly complementary, this rule causes the share effect (excessive incentives on the part of each party to expend investment or effort in order to increase his/her share of the surplus) to dominate the probability effect (insufficient incentives arising from the fact that each party obtains only part of the increase in the expected surplus), and thus leads to excessive investment and effort relative to the joint-payoff-maximising levels. If the court cannot capture the employer’s investment as fully as the employee’s effort, the employer’s investment may be too low compared to the joint-payoff-maximising level.     

Implicit protectionism via state enterprises and technology transfer from foreign enterprises

We formulate a mixed triopoly in which one state enterprise competes with one domestic and one foreign private enterprise. The private enterprise can transfer its technology to the private rival, which reduces the rival’s production cost. We show that if the privatization policy is endogenous, then the foreign firm voluntarily transfers its technology. We also show that the foreign enterprise may strategically raise its local ownership share. These results suggest that the existence of a state enterprise and its potential future privatization serve as an industrial policy that improves the domestic firm’s competitive advantage relative to the foreign enterprise.     

Is corporate governance important for regulated firms’ shareholders?: Evidence from Japanese mergers and acquisitions

This paper compares the reaction of bidders’ stock prices to acquisition announcements by regulated non-financial firms, banks, and unregulated companies in Japan. Results suggest that regulated non-financial firms do not experience a significant stock price response at merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements, although banks’ and unregulated firms’ M&A announcements are regarded favorably by the stock market. Furthermore, the effect of stock option usage and strict boards on the stock price response is weak for regulated non-financial bidders. The results provide additional evidence that regulation results in managerial decisions’ having less influence on shareholder wealth and thereby changes the firm's optimal governance structure. In contrast, the results provide no clear evidence that, for bank bidders, there is a significantly stronger or weaker relationship between governance and the stock price response to an M&A announcement than that of unregulated firms or regulated non-financial firms. The result does not support the view that regulatory monitoring weakens the effect of ordinary governance mechanisms.     

Regional Economic Integration and Article XXIV of the GATT

This paper studies the economic impact of regionalism under the realistic assumptions of constant tariffs and asymmetric bloc formation. As an extension of the Krugman framework, the impact is decomposed into several components, each of which has a clear economic implication. Economic integration definitely worsens outsiders' welfare even if the external tariffs of the bloc are unraised. Bloc members' welfare first increases with the expansion of the bloc; but when about half of the world is united into the bloc, welfare begins to decrease. Simulation results shed some light on the incentive structure of major participants, who face various configurations of regional integration.