Forecasting Turkey’s Credit Ratings with Multivariate Grey Model and Grey Relational Analysis

The concept of credit rating rooted back to mid-nineteenth century has become one of the most important elements in the world economy together with the globalization period gradually accelerating in the last two decades and increasing the interaction and sensitivity in the international markets. With the globalization and deepening in the financial markets; the effect, reliability and stability of knowledge of the actors who are in charge for directing the global capital flows have quite a big importance in terms of the decisions to be made in the future. In this process, credit rating agencies eliminating the information asymmetry between the countries and institutions who want to create financial resource by borrowing from the savings owners and foreign institutions. Credit ratings determined by the mentioned organizations are accepted as an indicator of the countries to meet the financial obligations in other words their creditworthiness. For Turkey’s economy having a structure with a high level of external financing needs in terms of accelerating the growth and development process, it is inevitable to have an international creditworthiness increasing long-term investment tendency meeting foreign capitals’ trust search. In this study, firstly the determinants of the credit ratings given by credit rating agencies are determined and then forecasting Turkey’s future credit ratings by combining them with multivariate grey model and grey relational analysis are performed.

     

Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined

If there is a cartel agreement among a subset of firms in an industry, it should be predicted that all firms in that industry will increase prices. Nevertheless, industry prices alone should not indicate that a particular firm is guilty of that conspiracy. According to the output test and its market share variant – proposed by Blair and Romano – if the output or the market share of the firm that claims to be innocent in the collusive activity rises in response to the price increase, that firm's claim should be accepted as true. Using a collusive variant of the dominant firm model, this paper shows that these are not robust tests to reveal either innocence or guilt, and characterizes cases where they may pardon a guilty firm (Type I error) or indict an innocent firm (Type II error). This paper also shows that a market share test can not be used to prove a dominant firm's intent for predatory pricing.