The 1986 U.K. Insolvency and Company Directors' Disqualification Acts: An evaluation of their impacts upon small firm financing decisions

This paper examines the potential impact of the 1986 U.K. Insolvency and Company Directors' Disqualification Acts on small firm financing decisions. With the aid of a simplified Black and Scholes (1973) option model of financing decisions, the paper illustrates how the 1986 legislation reduces the incentives for owner-managers to gamble with creditor claims, particularly in situations of financial distress, by making them personally liable for unmet claims and/or by disqualifying them from holding office for a fixed period. For instance, example 3 in the paper shows the conflict that could result from the owner-manager reducing his/her opening equity position and it further argues how the legislation should act to alleviate the situation. It remains, however, an empirical question as to whether this reduction in creditors' exposure to the risk of uncompensated wealth transfers will ultimately result in a significantly greater number of company liquidations and disqualifications, particularly during a prolonged economic downturn, or an improved/less costly supply of finance to small firms.     

Building Brands through Brand Alliances: Does a Second Ally Help?

Several papers have been published demonstrating the positive effects a single, reputable ally has on evaluations of a focal brand. Interestingly, little research has been published examining the effects of multiple brand allies. We examine the effect of an alliance with two, one, or zero well-known brand allies on evaluations of a previously unknown focal brand. The presence of a single brand ally significantly increased perceived quality and hedonic and utilitarian attitudes. While multiple alliances improved focal brand evaluations relative to the no ally condition, the second ally did not increase evaluations relative to the single ally condition.     

Issues in Marketing Online Insurance Products: An Exploratory Look at Agents' Use, Attitudes, and Views of the Impact of the Internet

This article uses a survey of insurance agents in Florida to examine the manner in which insurance agents use and view the Internet as a method of marketing insurance products. The results of the survey suggest that the agents’ use of the Web and their attitudes toward the Web do not vary by demographic characteristics (including age, education level, gender, and income). In addition, the agents’ perception of the Internet as a threat (rather than an opportunity) does not vary by age or education level and is not correlated with their attitudes toward the use of the Web. However, while Internet marketing and other means of direct selling are viewed by the agents as equal threats to their sales, the agents believe that such marketing by other companies is a greater threat than that done by the companies they represent.     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.     

Class length and student performance: An extended study

Many accounting educators believe that the student learning of accounting is better facilitated over a longer period of time, rather than a shorter period of time. This study examined the results of student performance in two introductory accounting courses, comparing student performance results of four-week summer classes with the results of traditional 16-week courses. In this research, the same professor taught the spring and summer ACC 201 courses, and two other professors taught both the spring and summer ACC 211 courses. Also held constant were the lecture material, course assignment, and test content. The results of the study indicate that in general, students taking introductory accounting over four weeks fare about as well as students who take introductory accounting over a traditional 16-week period. These results have potential importance beyond accounting education and provide support to universities offering more block courses to better serve individual student needs.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.