The importance of consumer multihoming (joint purchases) for market performance: Mergers and entry in media markets

Consumer “multihoming” (watching two TV channels, or buying two news magazines) has surprisingly important effects on market equilibrium and performance in (two‐sided) media markets. We show this by introducing consumer multihoming and advertising finance into the classic circle model of product differentiation. When consumers multihome (attend more than one platform), media platforms can charge only incremental value prices to advertisers. Entry or merger leaves consumer prices unchanged under consumer multihoming, but leaves advertiser prices unchanged under single‐homing: Multihoming flips the side of the market on which platforms compete. In contrast to standard circle results, equilibrium product variety can be insufficient under multihoming.     

Access Pricing,Quality Degradation,and Foreclosure in the Internet

Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The optimal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict between international and domestic regulation policy.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

Endogenous Growth and Trade Liberalization Between Small and Large Countries

The paper combines insight from new trade theory and R&D-based endogenous growth models to argue that there are ambiguous growth effects of trade liberalization between countries that differ in terms of the size of their home markets. In particular, trade liberalization may reduce R&D incentives in countries with low purchasing power without invoking parallel increases in countries with high purchasing power. The paper also considers the case of imperfect international knowledge spillovers, and demonstrates that complete trade liberalization may affect the growth rate negatively.     

Simulation-based pricing of convertible bonds

We propose and empirically investigate a pricing model for convertible bonds based on Monte Carlo simulation. The method uses parametric representations of the early exercise decisions and consists of two stages. Pricing convertible bonds with the proposed Monte Carlo approach allows us to better capture both the dynamics of the underlying state variables and the rich set of real-world convertible bond specifications. Furthermore, using the simulation model proposed, we present an empirical pricing study of the US market, using 32 convertible bonds and 69 months of daily market prices. Our results do not confirm the evidence of previous studies that market prices of convertible bonds are on average lower than prices generated by a theoretical model. Similarly, our study is not supportive of a strong positive relationship between moneyness and mean pricing error, as argued in the literature.     

Entry may increase network providers’ profit

In this paper the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals is analyzed. It is shown that open access may increase the platform sponsors’ profit levels and enhance quality improving investments. In addition, it is shown that a commitment to allow entry reduces the difference between ex ante and ex post compatibility incentives.     

Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers' Retail Sales Effort

A manufacturer's incentives to undertake noncontractible investments depend on the profit margin on her sales to the retailer, and slotting allowances can facilitate such incentives by increasing unit wholesale prices. At first glance it is tempting to conclude that slotting allowances should be particularly prevalent for product categories where the manufacturer's scope for undertaking noncontractible sales effort is relatively large. At odds with this, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) among other organizations, reports that slotting allowances are more commonly used for product categories where the scope for noncontractible effort by the manufacturer is presumably relatively small. To scrutinize this puzzle we set up a simple model with one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer undertakes noncontractible demand‐enhancing investments. The predictions from the model are consistent with market observations.     

What is going on in the oil market?

Conclusion In this article, we propose a consistent view on the recent oil-price history based on fundamental data and economic theory. We sum up: After the turn of the century three major stylized shocks have hit market. First, the demand curve has shifted fight outwards, mainly driven, as extensively reported in the media, by sustained growth in China and other Asian Countries. Second, supply disruptions in countries with low extraction costs (Iraq and Venezuela) have shifted the supply curve to the left. Third, we show that speculators adjust their inventories in order to take advantage of predictable price fluctuations and play themselves a major role in the price formation. Optimal storage theory implies that aggregate inventories are negatively related to the oil price and positively to the volatility of supply and demand shocks. We provide evidence that the political events in the last years have increased volatility and induced the inventory curve to shift right outwards. We analyze in a graphical framework the interaction of all these shocks and conclude that speculators have caused the oil price to overshoot in the short run its long-run fundamental value. However, this is not at all attributable to market failure or the harmfulness of speculators. In fact, the opposite is true. Speculators have in general a dampening effect on the oil price. The record oil price in the very recent history is partly a consequence of speculators maintaining or building-up inventories to cope with the supply and demand shocks to come. Hence, high prices represent a short-term toll for future price stability. It follows from our analysis that the oil price is expected to fall towards its long-term mean, provided that no further shocks hit the economy and, critically, the oil supply. As we saw, this prediction is consistent with the observed prices in the futures markets. Also in terms of future price volatility, the outlook is rather upbeat. The increased inventory levels held by speculators will cushion the spot market against fluctuations in natural supply and demand and limit the degree to which the currently high underlying volatility will translate into higher price volatility. We would like to thank Manuel Ammann, Bernd Brommundt, Stephan Kessler, Ralf Seiz, Michael Verhofen, Hemrich von Wyss, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments We are particularly indebted to Sergej Peisotchenko at United Energy System (UES) of Russia and Jan Gjerde at Shell for clearing us up on technical aspects of oil production     

Mergers and partial ownership

We compare the profitability of a merger between two firms in which one firm fully acquires another and the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement in which the acquiring firm, although owning less than 100% of the acquired firm, is nevertheless able to obtain corporate control over all pricing decisions. We find that joint profit can be higher in the latter case because it may result in a greater dampening of competition with respect to an outside competitor when the partial ownership arrangement is publicly observable. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and the outside firm and use them to explain puzzling features of the pay-TV markets in Norway and Sweden.     

Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D Policy in an Economic Union

What are the consequences of decentralized R&;D policies within an economic union? Do non-cooperative policies generate too high R&;D subsidies? To address such questions, we construct a simple model where firms invest in quality-improving R&;D. With goods produced in different countries within an economic union, we compare non-cooperative and cooperative R&;D policies. We show that non-cooperative policies imply too small R&;D subsidies for horizontally differentiated goods and too high subsidies for close substitutes. Furthermore, small countries have less incentive to subsidize R&;D than large countries, resulting in an unwarranted vertical product differentiation between goods produced in different countries.