Two state capital accumulation with heterogenous products: Disruptive vs. non-disruptive goods

The paper considers the problem of a firm that, while producing a standard product, has the option to introduce an innovative product. The innovative product competes with the standard product and will therefore reduce revenues of the standard product. A distinction is made between innovative products that do or do not become even more relatively appealing as their market share grows (e.g., because of network externalities). It is shown that in the former case, which we call a “disruptive” good, history dependent long run equilibria can occur, which are in line with recent real life economic examples.     

A note on the long rate in factor models of the term structure

In this paper, we consider factor models of the term structure based on a Brownian filtration. We show that the existence of a nondeterministic long rate in a factor model of the term structure implies, as a consequence of the Dybvig–Ingersoll–Ross theorem, that the model has an equivalent representation in which one of the state variables is nondecreasing. For two‐dimensional factor models, we prove moreover that if the long rate is nondeterministic, the yield curve flattens out, and the factor process is asymptotically nondeterministic, then the term structure is unbounded. Finally, we provide an explicit example of a three‐dimensional affine factor model with a nondeterministic yet finite long rate in which the volatility of the factor process does not vanish over time.     

R&D competition versus R&D cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure

This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements) and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D competition.     

Optimal dynamic environmental policies of a profit maximizing firm

In this paper we study the optimal environmental policy of the firm for different scenarios dependent on (costs of) production technologies, financing costs, and governmental policy. The governmental instruments to be considered are:

Anticipation effects of technological progress on capital accumulation: a vintage capital approach

Due to embodied technological progress new generations of capital goods are more productive. Therefore, in order to study the effects of technological progress, a model must be analyzed in which different generations of capital goods can be distinguished. We determine in what way the firm adjusts current investments to predictions of technological progress. In the presence of market power we show that a negative anticipation effect occurs, i.e. current investments in recent generations of capital goods decline when faster technological progress will take place in the future, because then it becomes more attractive to wait for new generations of capital goods. In case that only investments in new machines are possible, actually a whole wave of anticipation phases arises.     

Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty

This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level. The simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence/accommodation to consider a timing/delay element. We find that, when applying an entry deterrence policy, the first investor, or incumbent, overinvests in capacity for two reasons. First, it delays the investment of the second investor, or entrant. Second, the entrant will invest in less capacity. We also find that greater uncertainty makes entry deterrence more likely.     

Involving purchasing in new product development

Purchasing is evolving into a strategic business activity and thus also a potential contributor to the successful development of new products. However, the literature on the involvement of purchasing in new product development (NPD) is sorely lacking. We conducted an exploratory study to investigate purchasing's involvement in NPD, the drivers of this involvement and the influence on new product success. We conducted telephone interviews with purchasing and NPD managers from 43 firms. The results show that firms differ in the extent to which they involve purchasing in NPD and that higher involvement has a positive effect on NPD performance. R&D managers can use the results to design a more effective purchasing–R&D interface and increase the success of NPD.