Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision‐making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the size of an individual bribe might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. Anticorruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation, if they lower the bribe levels demanded and thus encourage small businesses to participate.     

Correlation estimation using components of Japanese candlesticks

Using the wick’s difference from the classical Japanese candlestick representation of daily open, high, low, close prices brings efficiency when estimating the correlation in a bivariate Brownian motion. An interpretation of the correlation estimator given in [Rogers, L.C.G. and Zhou, F., Estimating correlation from high, low, opening and closing prices. Ann. Appl. Probab., 2008, 18(2), 813–823] in the light of wicks’ difference allows us to suggest modifications, which lead to an increased efficiency and robustness over the baseline model. An empirical study of four major financial markets confirms the advantages of the modified estimator.     

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

Forms of Opportunism Between Principals and Agents

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia, such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined. Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged.     

Are there barriers to innovation in retailing?

Recent data from the Community Innovation Survey challenge some of the conventional arguments that retailing is inherently less innovative than other sectors within developed economies. According to the data, firms in the UK retail sector are now converging on the all-sector average. Drawing on qualitative research undertaken within retail firms, this article begins by examining some of the implications of this and the reasons why survey data may still underestimate the extent of innovation in the sector. One of the potential contributory factors to an increase in reported levels of innovation may be a reduction in barriers to innovation. In a new analysis of the data, the article explores the nature and incidence of such barriers in the UK. It judges that, although barriers were already perceived to be low, further reductions may have played a part in stimulating innovation. However, amongst other factors, it also notes that the sector still lacks any reliance upon universities and HEIs to assist with strategic innovation. The article further concludes that present economic conditions are likely to detrimentally affect a number of the cost and market factors, which are the most significant barriers to innovation in the sector.     

Interbank market integration, loan rates, and firm leverage

This paper investigates the effect of interbank market integration on small firm finance in the build-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to 6047 firms across 14 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process. Our findings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also find that in the most rapidly integrating markets, firms became substantially overleveraged during the build-up to the crisis.