Equilibrium dominance in experimental financial markets

We examine the predictive power of equilibrium dominance inexperimental markets where firms with investment opportunitieshave an informational advantage over potential investors andare permitted to purchase a money-burning signal. Equilibriumdominance often fails to predict well when a Pareto-superiorsequential equilibrium is also available. Instead, equilibriumselection appears to be related to the potential earnings ofa more valuable firm that can signal its type successfully bydefecting from the sequential equilibrium.     

New technology and the restructuring of pit-level industrial relations in the British coal industry

Since the 1984–85 strike, British Coal has pursued its corporate objectives by restructuring operations, introducing new technology and intensifying work. The reconstruction of industrial relations which has accompanied these changes is analysed with particular emphasis on developments at colliery level.     

Pooling, separating, and semiseparating equilibria in financial markets: some experimental evidence

This study investigates experimental financial markets in whichfirms possess more information than do potential investors.Firms were given opportunities to undertake positive net presentvalue projects which they could either forgo or finance by sellingequity. Auctions were conducted among the investors for theright to finance the projects. When the theoretical equilibriumwas unique, theory predicted well. When theory permitted pooling,separation, and semiseparation, only the more efficient poolingequilibrium was observed. The domination of the pooling equilibriumwas robust to different experimental experiences by participants.When available, signals were used by good firms to distinguishthemselves from bad.