World market integration for export and food crops in developing countries: a case study for Mali and Nicaragua

Using a generalized error correction model, this article measures and compares market integration for export cash crops versus imported food crops for Mali and Nicaragua, and computes transmission elasticities between changes in the goods’ border and domestic prices. Both Mali and Nicaragua obtain the bulk of their export revenue from a particular agricultural commodity—cotton for Mali and coffee for Nicaragua—and both import the same key staple food of rice. To reap the economic gains from this trade specialization, the two countries’ agriculture must be well‐integrated into world markets. The two countries present an important policy contrast that affects their degree of world market integration and price transmission. In Mali, a parastatal enterprise controls its cotton industry, while Nicaragua has less state direction over agriculture. Reflecting this difference, the results show that for both its main export and import commodity, Nicaragua is more integrated into world markets and has higher price transmission than Mali. The results for Nicaragua also show much higher integration and price transmission for its main agricultural export (coffee) than its major import (rice).     

The growing importance of the former USSR countries in world agricultural markets

The major countries of the former Soviet Union—specifically Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—are becoming increasingly important in world agricultural markets. The two main developments are that this region has become a large grain exporter, especially of wheat and barley, and Russia a big agricultural importer, especially of meat. These trends should continue for the next decade. However, policies to expand the livestock sector could mitigate these developments, as increased domestic meat production would reduce both meat imports and surplus feed grain for export. Also, further growth in the region's grain exports will require improvement in the infrastructure for storing and transporting grain.     

Can Russia be Competitive in Agriculture?

Can Russia be competitive in Agriculture? Russian agriculture currently is not internationally cost competitive. Since the mid‐1990s Russia has imported large volumes of meat, while the grain trade has fluctuated in most years between small net imports and exports. Russia has, however, exported large quantities of key agricultural inputs, including 80 per cent of fertilizer output, mainly to EU countries. Research indicates that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain compared to meat, but also a comparative advantage in producing agricultural inputs compared to agricultural outputs. The expected real appreciation of the Russian rouble vis‐à‐vis Western currencies should further damage Russia's cost competitiveness in meat and grain, but this should be offset by modest productivity growth. An expected rise in consumer income, deriving from relatively high annual GDP growth of about 4–5 per cent, should also stimulate demand for meat imports. In spring 2003, Russia imposed tariff rate quotas on its imports of beef and pork, and a pure quota on imports of poultry. For other agricultural commodities, Russia is pushing in its WTO accession negotiations for allowable agricultural import tariffs that are higher than current levels. Taking these changes together, it is likely that Russia will continue as a big meat importer for about the next ten years–with tariff rate quotas probably determining the level of meat imports–and will become a moderate grain exporter. L'agriculture russe pourrait‐elle être compétitive ? Actuellement, l'agriculture russe n'est pas compétitive. La Russie a importé de gros volumes de viande depuis le milieu des années 90, tandis que la balance des échanges de céréales oscillait entre les faibles excédents et les faibles déficits. Cependant, la Russie est grande exportatrice d'agro‐fournitures dont, en particulier, 80% de sa production d'engrais, principalement vers l'Europe. On montre ici que l'avantage comparatif de la Russie se situe dans les céréales plutôt que dans la viande et, surtout, dans les agro‐fournitures plutôt que dans les denrées agricoles. La remontée, à laquelle il faut s'attendre, du rouble vis à vis des devises occidentales, devrait encore diminuer la compétitivité de la Russie en matière de viandes et de céréales, ce qui devrait être compensé par des gains de productivité même faibles. La hausse attendue des revenus des consommateurs, engenderée par une croissance élevée du revenu national, de l'ordre de 4 à 5% par an, devrait aussi stimuler la demande de viande importée. Au printemps 2003, la Russie s'est dotée d'un système de droits sur ses importations hors quotas de viande de bæuf et de pore, ainsi que d'un quota d'importation pour les produits avicoles. En ce qui conceme les autres produits agricoles, dans le cadre des négociations relatives à son entrée dans l'OMC, la Russie s'efforce d'obtenir l'autorisation d'augmenter les taxes à l'importation par rapport à leur niveau actuel. Au total done, à un horizon de l'ordre de dix ans, il est probable que la Russie reste un gros importateur de viandes ‐ le niveau des taxes sur le hors quotas déterminant les niveaux d'importation ‐, et un modeste exportateur de céréales. Kann Russland auf dem Agrarsektor wettbewerbsfähig sein? Die russische Landwirtschaft ist hinsichtlich der Kosten momentan nicht international wettbewerbsfähig. Seit Mitte der 1990er importiert Russland große Mengen an Fleisch, während der Getreidehandel in den meisten Jahren zwischen geringen Nettoimporten und ‐exporten schwankte. Russland hat jedoch große Mengen an wichtigen landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen, unter anderem 80% seiner Düngerproduktion, hauptsächlich in EU‐Länder exportiert. Forschungsergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Russland in der Produktion von Getreide verglichen mit Fleisch einen komparativen Vorteil besitzt; dies trifft jedoch ebenfalls auf die Produktion von landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen verglichen mit landwirtschaftlichen Endprodukten zu. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die erwartete reale Aufwertung des russischen Rubel gegenüber den westlichen Währungen eine zusätzliche Verschlechterung der russischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hinsichtlich der Kosten im Bereich Fleisch und Getreide nach sich zieht; dies sollte sich jedoch durch ein moderates Produktivitätswachstum ausgleichen. Der erwartete Anstieg der Verbrauchereinkommen, der sich aus dem relativ hohen jährlichen Bruttoin‐landsproduktzuwachs von ca. 4–5 Prozent ableitet, sollte sich ebenfalls stimulierend auf die Nachfrage nach Fleischimporten auswirken. Im Frühjahr 2003 führte Russland Zolltarifkontingente für seine Schweine‐ und Rindfleischimporte ein und belegte seine Geflügelfleischimporte mit einem Importkontingent. Im Hinblick auf weitere Agrarerzeugnisse drängt Russland in den WTO‐Beitrittsverhandlungen darauf, höhere Einfuhrzölle als die gegenwärtig geltenden zuzulassen. In Anbetracht all dieser Veränderungen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Russland auch für die kommenden zehn Jahre große Mengen an Fleisch importieren–wobei möglicherweise Zolltarifkontingente die Menge bestimmen werden–und sich zu einem mäßigen Getreideexporteur entwickeln wird.     

Decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps: an application to Russia

The article develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps, defined as the difference between a commodity's domestic producer and border prices. We use OECD's procedure for decomposing changes in the market price support part of producer support estimates as the starting point for our decomposition method, and our method provides a basis for critiquing OECD's decomposition approach. The transmission of changes in border prices (world prices and the exchange rate) to domestic prices is a key element in the decomposition. The method is demonstrated using Russian agricultural price gaps. The results support the argument that for Russian agriculture during the transition period, the main cause of changes in price gaps has been incomplete transmission of changes in the exchange rate to domestic prices, and where the weak transmission results mainly not from policy intervention, but rather from deficient market conditions, in particular poor market infrastructure. The policy implication is that underdeveloped infrastructure has strongly limited the benefits to the Russian economy from agricultural trade liberalization.     

ECONOMIC RENT AND ESTIMATION OF SOVIET GNP GROWTH

The extraction of fuels and metals and production of agricultural goods in the USSR involve increasing marginal cost, which generates economic rent. In computing Soviet GNP accounts, though, the CIA excludes economic rent in measuring value added. The effect is to value output at average, as opposed to marginal, cost. The exclusion of rent understates the shares of fuels, metals, and agriculture in Soviet GNP, which adversely affects the CIA's calculations of Soviet growth. In this paper, the author estimates the economic rent generated by Soviet extraction of fuels and metals and agricultural production. He then uses the estimates to recompute the shares of these sectors in Soviet GNP, and GNP growth. The results suggest that inclusion of economic rent in value added (or alternatively, marginal cost valuation of output) more than doubles the share in GNP of mining (fuels and metals extraction), and increases agriculture's share during the 1980s from 20 percent to about 25 percent. The reestimates of Soviet GNP growth also differ from those of the CIA by 10–30 percent.     

Evaluating Agricultural Productivity and Policy in Russia

Russia's transition to a market economy in the early 1990s shocked its agricultural sector, creating the potential for profit and gains from specialisation and productivity improvements. However, subsequent regional agricultural development has been highly uneven, and the sources of the sector's productivity improvement remain unclear. Drawing on a newly-assembled Russian regional farm production and policy dataset, we evaluate agricultural total factor productivity growth from 1994 to 2013, decomposing that growth into technical progress and efficiency gains, for the nation as a whole and for the major agricultural districts of the South and Central. We then test how investments in road and rail infrastructure and human capital have influenced those gains. The South substantially outperformed the Central district and the nation at large with respect to all three performance indicators. However, contrary to the literature, we find that these particular state policies provided no substantial growth advantages, there or elsewhere. Rather, the dominant force behind Russia's agricultural growth has been informal technical change.     

Decomposing Changes in Agricultural Producer Prices

This article develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices. The method builds on a procedure used by the World Bank, with the main variables in the decomposition being trade prices, exchange rates and trade policies. We expand on the World Bank decomposition procedure by broadening the analysis of policy effects, adding the effect from incomplete transmission of changes in trade prices and exchange rates to producer prices, and handling the effect on prices from interactions between variables as they change simultaneously. Decomposition results are presented for various commodities for the major emerging markets of Brazil, China and South Africa.