Temporary immigration visas

This paper deals with recent proposals concerning temporary immigration visas as a means to combat the problem of illegal immigration. We set up a simple two-period model of international migration between a poor South and a rich North with temporary visas issued for one period. Because of capital market imperfections, immigrants from the South face additional capital costs when financing the visa fee. In this model, we find that temporary visas can improve welfare in the North if capital costs of the immigrants are sufficiently low. For high capital costs, however, a welfare reduction cannot be ruled out. We extend the model to the case of heterogeneous immigrants and asymmetric information. In this setting, we show that the government in the North may have an incentive to issue temporary visas for those with low capital costs and to tolerate illegal immigration of the others.     

Size versus scope: on the trade-off facing economic unions

This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain over the degree of centralization within the union. In our model, strategic delegation affects the identity of the representatives, and hence the equilibrium policy outcome. We show that the relationship between the extensive and the intensive margin of centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a certain threshold a larger size implies deeper integration, whereas beyond that threshold centralization declines with further increases in size. We also show that freezing the level of centralization and associate memberships can mitigate this trade-off.     

Aging,Factor Returns,and Immigration Policy

Immigration has various economic and non‐economic effects on the destination country's inhabitants. In this paper, we focus on the impact of immigration on factor returns and analyze how aging affects immigration policy, employing a dynamic political‐economy model of representative democracy. Aging, that is, a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration in this framework. This immigration effect may even overcompensate the initial contraction of the labor force. We show that the immigration rate in the representative democracy equilibrium exceeds the immigration rate that would maximize welfare of current and future generations, and we also discuss the influence of social security on immigration policy.     

Political Participation of Mobile Citizens and the Size of the Welfare State

This paper deals with the implications of personal mobilityfor political participation of citizens and for the resultingsize of the welfare state. We show that mobility of citizensmay influence the individual decision to participate in thepolitical process and thereby may change policy outcomes. Ifcitizens who prefer a larger public sector are relatively immobile,the size of the welfare state may increase with mobility. (JELD72, J61)     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

Time Consistent Optimal Redistribution Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper analyzes optimal redistribution policy in a two‐period version of the overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals and asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. The government of the first period determines redistribution transfers for the first period but is not able to set the policy variables for the second period. With respect to savings the paper considers two scenarios: In the first scenario savings are observable and the government can set individual savings levels in addition to redistributive transfers. In the second scenario savings and capital incomes are not observable. In both cases the redistribution equilibrium is not second‐best efficient.     

Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?

This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the rate of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.     

Mode of International Investment and Endogenous Risk of Expropriation

This paper analyzes the relationship between the mode of international investment and institutional quality. Foreign investors from a capital‐rich North can either purchase productive assets in a capital‐poor South and transfer their capital within integrated multinational firms or they can form joint ventures with local asset owners. The South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use its political power to expropriate productive assets. The expropriation risk lowers the incentive to provide specific capital in an integrated firm and distorts the decision between joint ventures and integrated production. We determine the equilibrium risk of expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization, which is reflected in a decline in investment costs, influences institutional quality.