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1.
I examine the effect of reform on telecom performance using a second-generation regulatory framework index and panel data techniques to test how regulatory governance affected sector performance in 22 Latin American countries during the period 1980–1997. Sound regulatory governance in telecommunications has a positive impact on network expansion and efficiency, in both the static and dynamic specifications. Openness of markets to competition and divestment of former state-owned telco operators also contributed positively to better sector performance. The dynamic specification shows that past performance has its own strong effect on present (and perhaps future) performance. 相似文献
2.
Luis Ubeda 《Economic Theory》2003,23(1):195
Summary. Although not assumed explicitly, we show that neutrality plays an important role in Arrow and other impossibility theorems. Applying it to pivotal voters we produce direct proofs of classical impossibility theorems, including Arrow's, as well as extend some of these theorems. We further explore the role of neutrality showing that it is equivalent to Pareto or reverse Pareto, and to effective dictatorship for non-null social welfare functions satisfying the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is also equivalent to Wilson's Citizens' Sovereignty--which is related to the intuition that symmetry over alternatives makes social preference depend only on citizens' preferences. We show that some of these results are more fundamental than others in that they extend both to infinite societies and to considerably smaller domains of preferences. Finally, as an application of Arrow's theorem, we provide a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.Received: 13 April 2000, Revised: 6 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers:
D71, C70.I thank Salvador Barberá, Luis Corchón, Cesar Martinelli, Eric Maskin, Tomas Sjöström, Ricard Torres, José Pedro Ubeda, and an anonymous referee for feedback. The proofs of Arrow's theorem and two Wilson's theorems come from a note I wrote in 1987 at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (Ubeda [16]). In 1996 Geanakoplos [7] wrote a proof of Arrow's theorem similar but not identical to mine. All work in this paper is independent of his. 相似文献
3.
Luis C. Nunes Paul Newbold Chung-Ming Kuan 《Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics》1997,59(4):435-448
Nelson and Plosser (1982), in a classic paper, failed to find strong evidence against the null hypothesis of a generating process with a unit autoregressive root for thirteen US macroeconomic time series. Perron (1989) claimed that such evidence was available for a majority of these series if the alternative hypothesis was of trend stationarity with a break in 1929. Zivot and Andrews (1992) treated the break date as endogenous, then finding strong evidence agcainst the null for a minority of these series. Our own analysis extends theirs by permitting a break under the null as well as the alternative hypothesis, and allowing for the sequential nature of the testing. Our empirical findings complete the circle. We find no strong evidence against the unit root hypothesis for any of the thirteen Nelson–Plosser series. 相似文献
4.
José Luis Ferreira 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,108(1):141-151
We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect. 相似文献
5.
Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling. 相似文献
6.
Borges del Rosal Africa San Luis Concepción Sánchez-Bruno Alfonso 《Quality and Quantity》2003,37(3):303-316
Quality &; Quantity - Cliff (1993) has proposed the use of a measure of effect size alternative to traditionalmean differences: δ {? = Pr(xi1 &;gt; xj2) - Pr(xi1 &;lt; xj2)}which,... 相似文献
7.
Luis A. Gil-Alana 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(3):257-266
In this article, we show that macroeconomic time series may contain unit and fractional roots at both, at zero and at zero and at the seasonal frequencies. The importance of the root at the long run or zero frequency requires in many cases to consider this root at both, separately in an independent polynomial, and also included in the seasonal one. Several Monte Carlo experiments are conducted to examine cases when the root at the zero frequency is not appropriately considered. An empirical application based on the tests of Robinson, Peter M. “Efficient Tests of Nonstationary Hypotheses,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89, 1994, pp. 1420–37 is also carried out at the end of the article.The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Government of Navarra (“Ayudas de Formación e Investigación y Desarrollo”). 相似文献
8.
Abstract. This paper examines the seasonal structure of German real GNP per capita by using a version of Robinson's (1994) tests which is suitable in the context of seasonality. This method has several advantages over alternative approaches when testing for seasonal unit roots. First, unlike standard tests, which are nested in AR alternatives, it is embedded in fractional alternatives. Second, it allows testing at the zero frequency and at each of the seasonal frequencies separately. Third, it makes it possible to test for different orders of integration at each of the frequencies simultaneously. The empirical analysis suggests that the real output series may have a unit root at the zero frequency, and fractional rather than unit roots at the seasonal ones. This is in contrast to the findings reported by Lutkepohl et al. (1999) in their study on German money demand, and shows the importance of modelling the seasonal features of the data in alternative ways. 相似文献
9.
Summary We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.The authors wish to thank William Thomson, Salvadpr Barberá, José Angel Silva and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The remaining errors are our exclusive responsibility. Financial support from DGICYT under project PB 91-0756 and the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
10.
We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities. This model describes many markets more realistically than the model of Kreps and Scheinkman [Kreps, D., Scheinkman, J., 1983. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes. Bell J. Econ. 14, 326–337]. We show that in this new model every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. 相似文献