MIMICKING THE WINNER LEADS TO WAR: AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION*

This note applies an evolutionary analysis to Skaperdas's (1992) static model of conflict and cooperation, in which agents are faced with trade‐offs between joint production and share competition. We adopt the stochastic evolution approach, and assume that each agent occasionally mimics the action of the winner of the stage. In contrast to Skaperdas's results that justify full or partial cooperation in productive activity, the long‐run equilibrium must exhibit total conflict; nobody engages in production at all.     

La valeur économique de l’audit et son efficacité dans le fonctionnement de l’école publique

Les auteurs examinent l’incidence de l’audit sur le fonctionnement de l’école publique en poursuivant deux objectifs : déterminer si les audits procurent des avantages économiques aux parties prenantes et définir l’incidence de la complexité des règles à observer sur l’efficacité de l’audit. Utilisant des données relatives au temps consacréà l’audit et profitant de l’occasion unique offerte par la Quality Basic Education Act en Georgie, les auteurs estiment le rendement relatif des activités des arrondissements scolaires au moyen d’une méthode stochastique d’estimation des frontières. Ils constatent que l’audit produit de véritables avantages économiques pour les parties prenantes en atténuant le manque d’efficience de l’utilisation des ressources scolaires. Ils constatent également que la rigueur des règles à observer réduit l’efficacité de l’audit mais que l’expérience des auditeurs peut contribuer à surmonter ce problème. Le fait que les coûts d’audit ne soient pas communiqués entrave la réalisation d’une analyse coûts‐avantages des nouvelles exigences. L’analyse des auteurs vient confirmer la thèse selon laquelle l’audit est indispensable à l’établissement de mécanismes de gouvernance et la communication des coûts d’audit est importante dans l’évaluation adéquate d’une nouvelle politique. Les données pertinentes peuvent être obtenues auprès des sources publiques indiquées dans le texte.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR COMPANY PRESIDENTS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN*

Kaplan (1994 ) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents’ stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents’ wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977–2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay–performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from ?2.1% to 14.8%.     

The Economic Value of Auditing and Its Effectiveness in Public School Operations*

We examine the impact of auditing on public school operations with two objectives: to investigate whether audits provide economic benefits to stakeholders and how complex compliance rules impact auditing effectiveness. Utilizing auditing time data and a unique opportunity presented by the Quality Basic Education Act in Georgia, we estimate the relative performance of school district operations employing a stochastic frontier estimation technique. We find that auditing produces real economic benefits for stakeholders by mitigating inefficiency in the use of school resources. We also find that stringent compliance rules reduce an audit’s effectiveness but auditors’ experience can help to overcome the problems. The lack of disclosure of auditing costs hinders the ability to conduct a cost–benefit analysis of new requirements. Our analysis supports the notion that auditing is vital to establish governance mechanisms and disclosure of auditing costs is important to adequately evaluate a new policy. Data are available from the public sources identified in the text.     

INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS,IRREVERSIBILITY OF INVESTMENTS AND FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

In this paper, we analyse the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to improve long‐run welfare when productive investment is irreversible and uncollateralizable and there is no insurance. Only fiat money or government issued bonds provide self‐insurance. We demonstrate that an increase in precautionary savings reduces irreversible productive investment. Hence, subsidies to promote productive but irreversible investment should be financed in such a way that they do not reduce insurance capability. When lump‐sum subsidies are high, a consumption tax is likely to be more redistributive and thus more consumption smoothing than are the other sets of instruments analysed in our model.     

WELFARE LOSSES FROM NON‐TARIFF BARRIERS: THE JAPANESE BEEF QUOTA CASE*

A standard method of estimating deadweight losses caused by import quotas is to estimate a utility function by data over a period in which the quota is not imposed, and to use the estimated utility function to evaluate the virtual price of quota‐laden imports. This method, however, is not applicable if preferences are different between quota and non‐quota periods. In order to overcome this difficulty, the present study introduces a method of estimating a utility function directly from data in a quota period. This method is applied to the estimation of deadweight losses attributable to the Japanese beef quota.     

EVALUATING AUTOMOBILE INSPECTION POLICY USING AUTO INSURANCE DATA

This paper examines the effect of mandatory periodic safety inspections on traffic accident rates. Using a data set of more than 15,000 auto insurance policyholders in Japan, we investigate the relationship between car age and accident rates and find little evidence that accident rates decline due to safety inspections, specifically in the inspection year. The result holds, even if we take the heterogeneity across drivers into account, and is robust to various parametric and nonparametric procedures. We conjecture that our results are obtained (a) because most motor vehicle accidents are not caused by mechanical failures and (b) because government regulations impose too strict and frequent inspections on car owners in Japan. ( JEL C14, K32, L51, L98, R41)     

白领阶层的职务意识及其决定的主要原因

本文的主要目的是研究和阐明20世纪90年代后期中国工业企业中白领阶层的地位和特点。文中的数据来自于我们在武汉市所作的问卷调查以及由此所进行的统计判别分析。通过分析我们指出：尽管白领阶层的工资收入与普通工人没有什么差别，但他们的职务意识，特别是他们在对待市场化等问题的态度上更接近于管理人员。这种状况被认为主要是源于白领所拥有的较高的文化程度。这些分析结果意味着职务意识可能与工资等劳动条件没有太大关联。