If the landlord so wanted . . . Family,farm production,and land transfers in the manorial system1

The manorial system was a salient feature of the pre‐industrial economy in Europe from the early middle ages until the late nineteenth century. Despite its importance, it is not usually the main focus of eighteenth‐ and early nineteenth‐century European economic history. Looking at a vital manorial economy, this article deals with land transmissions, a crucial factor in the socioeconomic reproduction of pre‐industrial societies, and demonstrates both similarities and important differences between the tenants on manorial land and freeholders. Although their strategies were often similar, we show that the manorial system consisted of a two‐party government—the landlord and the tenant—whose interests did not always coincide. In the nineteenth century, market expansion and commercialization promoted more active landlord strategies in terms of demesne expansions and by means of implementing short‐term leases. This made intergenerational transfers within the family increasingly difficult for tenants.     

Manorial economy and corvée labour in southern Sweden 1650–1850*

This essay is an inquiry into manorial production in Scania. Its growth was dependent on the long‐term development of European grain prices. When prices increased landlords were encouraged to put more land under the plough. The estates’ main income came, to an increasing extent, from demesne production, which finally dominated the income profile. The peasants’ most important contribution to the landlords became, in most cases, their corvée labour, and their uncertain tenure rights were illustrated with great clarity in the continuing evictions, which were accelerated in the nineteenth century with the aim of expanding the demesne.     

Taxation and Tournaments

This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labor supply and income distribution in the context of the rank‐order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non‐zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society's welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.     

ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.     

Feeding the British: convergence and market efficiency in the nineteenth-century grain trade

This paper traces the evolution of the international market for wheat, from an emerging market structure after the repeal of the corn laws to a mature market characterized by efficient arbitrage after the introduction of the transatlantic telegraph and the growth of trade. Efficiency is documented using traditional price gap accounting as well as error correction modelling. Markets which traded directly with each other as well as markets which did not trade with each other were integrated. The traditional bilateral focus in market integration studies has been extended to a multivariate approach, which generates new insights into the pattern of diffusion of price shocks in the international economy. Shocks in the major importing nation, Britain, dominated in the emerging market phase, while shocks in the major exporting economy, the United States, dominated international price movements at the end of the nineteenth century.