Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy

We analyse a model of coalition government in a parliamentary democracy where parties care both for ideology and perks from office, and examine how the magnitude of this tradeoff affects the nature of coalitions that form. It is shown that equilibrium coalitions can be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically disconnected. The types of coalitions that emerge depend upon the relative importance of rents from office and the distribution of party ideologies. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between ideological connectedness of coalitions and rents from office.     

Supplier selection or collaboration? Determining factors of performance improvement when outsourcing manufacturing

An empirical study was designed to determine factors of performance improvement when outsourcing manufacturing. Findings from a survey of 136 manufacturing plants in Sweden show that most of them achieve their outsourcing motives, but not without trade-offs. Factors of performance improvements such as economies of scale or operations in low-cost countries can improve one performance dimension, such as product cost, yet negatively impact volume flexibility, speed or product innovation. The results show part characteristics and supplier operating capabilities are more important than supplier relationship strategies when outsourcing manufacturing, meaning that supplier selection trumps supplier collaboration in the make-or-buy decision.     

Trade-offs in make-buy decisions

While the previous literature uses transaction cost economics and the resource-based view to theoretically derive the benefits of outsourcing, it has so far overlooked how these theoretical underpinnings must be used to assess trade-offs involved in make-buy decisions as well. This study investigates trade-offs in make-buy decisions for the buying firm. It takes an operations strategy perspective and links manufacturing firms’ competitive priorities to outsourcing motives and resulting capabilities. Survey data from a representative sample of 136 manufacturing plants in Sweden is subjected to regressions analysis. In contrast to earlier empirical research, this study shows that resulting capabilities of strategic outsourcing initiatives are distinct, and, furthermore, do not emerge cumulatively. This has important implications for the ongoing debate over trade-offs in the operations strategy literature. Findings are clearly in support of the trade-off model and extend current research into the theoretical domain of make-buy decisions.     

Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India

The East India Company's conquest of India was facilitated by the behavior of its Indian rivals who not only did not ally against it, but often supported it militarily. Historians have typically attributed this to myopia, the failure to understand the long-term threat represented by the Company. We examine the negotiations leading up to a key conflict, the Third Mysore War, and find that the Company's allies were not myopic. The British parliament had, in 1784, passed Pitt's India Act, which limited the scope for unprovoked military aggression by the Company in India. This had changed the behavior of the Company, making its promises more credible. This enhanced credibility made it possible for the Company to secure as allies Indian regimes that were acting strategically in their self-interest. This is a new explanation for an old puzzle.     

Manufacturing outsourcing and its effect on plant performance—lessons for KIBS outsourcing

Despite the proclaimed advantages and popularity of outsourcing manufacturing and knowledge-intensive business services, there are few and mainly contradictory studies of its short- and long-term effects. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the way in which outsourcing manufacturing and design work relates to performance at plant level. The study is based on a large-scale survey among a representative sample of Swedish engineering plants. The results show no significant effects from outsourcing manufacturing on plant operating performance. The paper further shows that investments in technological and organizational capabilities explain the improvements of performance to a significantly higher extent than does outsourcing. The problems of additional costs and managing dependencies when applying partial outsourcing and separating interdependent key processes provide important insights to the analysis on the effects of outsourcing knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS).     

Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery

This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment of bribery on both bribery and compliance with regulations. The bribe amount is decided via Nash bargaining and regulatory compliance and whistle-blowing are strategic decisions. Moreover, investigations of bribery and noncompliance occur in a manner that may be interdependent. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing whistle-blowing has no effect on the frequency of bribery. When the bribery and noncompliance investigations are independent, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either makes no difference or induces more nonharassment bribery. Only when bribery detection increases the chance of noncompliance detection and asymmetric punishment leads to whistle-blowing for both types of entrepreneurs, can the shift succeed in reducing noncompliance. The result is robust to the case where legalization of bribe-giving is not feasible for nonharassment bribes.