Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare

Abstract.  Using a formal political economy model with asymmetric information, we illustrate the conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private financiers is welfare superior, inferior, or equivalent to a system based on an incentive regulatory scheme subject to capture by the regulatees. We explicitly consider the following factors: the cost of care and its efficiency in reducing the probability of an environmental accident, the social cost of public funds, the net profitability of the risky activities, the level of damages, and the regulatory capture bias. We characterize in such a parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other. JEL classification: D82, K32     

Stock Market Valuation of Deferred Tax Assets: Evidence from Internet Firms

Abstract:   We use the provisions of SFAS No. 109 , Accounting for Income Taxes , to examine the extent to which stock prices of Internet firms were associated with expectations of future profitability before versus after the 'market correction' in early 2000. We find that the valuation of deferred tax assets of firms with business models reliant on the level of web site traffic was significantly greater after the market correction. In our view, this evidence is consistent with pre‐correction mispricing.     

Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility

We show how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations (both simultaneous and sequential duopoly) depend on six industry characteristics. Low market volatility combined with intermediate market size favors inflexible technologies; large values of either volatility or size favor flexible technologies; low or intermediate values of both favor the coexistence of flexible and inflexible technologies. The possibility of a flexibility trap exists in industries of low volatility and intermediate size. Entry prevention can sometimes be achieved by inflexible technologies or flexible technologies, depending on the industry characteristics.     

Notes and Communications, Horses for Courses: Why Europe Should Not Harmonise its Book Policies

European countries have similar cultural goals for books. The most common are the promotion of reading and the production of (literary) books (of a diverse nature). The extent to which the free market can achieve the cultural goals is uncertain and differs across countries. In cases where the free market does not achieve the goals or politicians do not want to accept uncertainty, a policy instrument is needed. Commonly used instruments in Europe include the fixed book price, subsidies, libraries, and lower VAT. We demonstrate that differences among European countries matter and that harmonisation of European book policies is not a good idea.     

The Dynamics of Alliance Conditions in the Alliance Development Process

One of the key issues in understanding the developmental processes of strategic alliances is how the alliance conditions change over the different stages of alliance development. A related question concerns the nature of the co-evolutionary dynamics of alliances in terms of their constituent partner firms. In this article we propose an integrated process model of alliances that is based on alliance conditions, allianc developmental stages, and an alliance system comprising co-evolutionary elements. We suggest that alliance conditions, or the key characteristics of an alliance at any given moment, link the alliance environment (firm characteristics) and the alliance development process. We also explore how specific patterns of alliance conditions have differential impacts on the interactive elements of the alliance co-evolutionary system.     

Depositor Discipline in the Banking Sector in India: An Empirical Investigation

Journal of Quantitative Economics - The paper traces the determinants of depositor discipline in Indian banking. Using annual data on commercial banks covering the period 1996 to 2003, the findings...     

Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia: An Intertemporal DEA Approach

Recent contributions to growth theory stress the importance of localized innovation for the performance of more backward countries. In earlier papers, analyses by means of DEA techniques confirmed this intuition. In this paper, we extend this type of analysis by relaxing the macroeconomic viewpoint adopted until now. New databases on output, labor and capital input in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are developed for 40 countries. Using intertemporal DEA, it is found that changes in the global production frontier are localized at high levels of capital intensity. This result is stronger in agriculture than in manufacturing. Further, a decomposition of labor productivity growth in eight Asian countries for the period 1975–1992 into the effects of capital intensification, learning and innovation is made. The results suggest that there is a particular development path in which increases in capital intensity appear to be a prerequisite to benefit from international technology spillovers.JEL Classification: O14, O30, O40, O47     

Old flames never die – the role of binding social ties for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms

This paper investigates the role of social ties and family embeddedness for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms. Family firms are mostly characterized by close and often inseparable ties between the dominant family coalition and the firm and offer specific resources within a context of both rational as well as non-rational factors that influence entrepreneurial strategies. We empirically test (n =?181) the relationship between binding social ties and innovation, strategic renewal, and corporate venturing. Our findings indicate a strong significance for networks and close and stable relationships both to inside the firm and the outside in decision making for corporate venturing and innovation. In contrast, the results for strategic renewal show no relevance of strong social ties. We link up with the debate on the role of owners as an important stakeholder group.

     

Mortality,Human Capital and Persistent Inequality

Available evidence suggests high intergenerational correlation of economic status and persistent disparities in health status between the rich and the poor. This paper proposes a mechanism linking the two. We introduce health capital into a two-period overlapping generations model. Private health investment improves the probability of surviving from the first period of life to the next and, along with education, enhances an individual’s labor productivity. Poorer parents are of poor health, unable to invest much in reducing mortality risk and improving their human capital. Consequently, they leave less for their progeny. Despite convex preferences and technologies, initial differences in economic and health status may perpetuate across generations when annuities markets are imperfect.Additional support was provided by the National Science Foundation. Additional support was provided by the National Science Foundation.     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.