Negotiating the Evolution of the Hr Function: Practical Advice From the Health Care Sector

This paper has two aims. First, to consider explanations for the apparent gap between the paradigm of strategic human resource management on the one hand and actual HR practice on the other. Second, to generate practical advice for senior HR specialists who are aspriring to develop a strategic role for their function. the research underpinning these findings was based on case studies in three hospitals in Adelaide and a comparison of the findings with the situation at Leicester General NHS Trust where the first named author of this article was the HR director and a senior board member. the analysis reveals that specific features of each organisation's history, current structure and management, shape powerfully the nature of the HR function. Moreover, the local shaping factors define the degrees of freedom open to the HR function, so much so, that the notion that it can choose its organisational stance is here challenged.     

Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention

A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm posts a wage, to be paid to any worker hired. This paper considers the implications of firms posting contracts , in a random matching model with on-the-job search. More complex contracts enable firms to address both recruitment and retention problems by, for example, increasing the wage with tenure. The effect on the labour market is to reduce turnover, below the level required for efficient matching of workers to firms.     

Free Agency and the Allocation of Labor in Major League Baseball

In this paper we examine the allocation of labor under free agency by developing and testing a model to predict the migration of free agents. Data for individual players are used in a logit model that estimates the probability that a free agent will change teams as a function of several independent variables. Along with other authors, we find that free agents tend to migrate to big cities. In addition, we find evidence that the allocation of labor may be different under free agency than under the reserve clause and suggest a reason why Coase's theorem may not be applicable to this labor market.     

Moral Hazard,portfolio allocation,and asset returns for thrift institutions

This article examines the earnings performance of nontraditional assets allowed to thrifts since the early 1980s. It uses the statistical cost accounting methodology developed by Hester and Zoellner to estimate average returns on thrift portfolio investments for the years ending June 30, 1987 and June 30, 1988. Results show that average returns on land loans, service corporation investment, real estate investment, and commercial loans were significantly lower than returns on more traditional assets. The results are far more pronounced at capital deficient institutions, lending support to the hypothesis that they used nontraditional investments as a means of exploiting the deposit insurance system. Returns on nontraditional assets are significantly affected by geographic factors, even for well capitalized institutions. The article concludes with an evaluation of the reimposition of portfolio restrictions on thrifts by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the Federal Housing Finance Board, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. George Benston, Tom Fomby, Allen Berger, John Wolken, and anonymous referees made numerous constructive suggestions.     

Does direct foreign investment affect domestic credit constraints?

Firms in developing countries cite credit constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment. Direct foreign investment may ease credit constraints by bringing in scarce capital. Alternatively, if foreign firms borrow heavily from domestic banks, they may crowd local firms out of domestic capital markets. Using firm data from the Ivory Coast, we test whether: (1) domestic firms are more credit constrained than foreign firms, and (2) whether borrowing by foreign firms exacerbates domestic firm credit constraints. Results provide support for both hypotheses. We also find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less financially constrained than other domestic enterprises.