The impact of product diversification strategy on the corporate performance of large Spanish firms

We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable, as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance, which performance is not significantly different between them.     

Tracking Can Be More Equitable Than Mixing

Parents and policy‐makers often wonder whether and how the choice of a tracked or mixed educational system affects the equality of opportunity. I answer this question by analyzing the influence of peers on future educational results. I define an equal opportunity policy as one that maximizes the average lifetime income of the worst‐off type of individuals in society (i.e., students from disadvantaged backgrounds). I find that tracking maximizes average lifetime income if the opportunity cost of college attendance is sufficiently high.     

Non-Segmented Equilibria Under Differential Taxation: Evidence from the Canadian Government Bond Market

This paper investigates tax effects in the Canadian governmentbond market during the period 1964—1986. Unlike previousstudies, we apply both statistical and nonstatistical teststoanalyze clientele effects and market equilibria. The resultsdivide the sample into two distinct periods of time, with theend of 1976 marking the division. We find that tax effects arealmost nonexistent in the Canadian government bond market beforethe end of 1976, but are predominant in the post-1976 period.Non-segmented market equilibria cannot be rejected before 1977,but are strongly rejected after 1976. In fact, segmented equilibriawith clientele effects in both quantities and prices characterizethe entire five year period from 1982 to 1986. These findingsare consistent with tax reforms, government deficit financingand interest rate fluctuations in Canada during our sample period.     

Management Information System – A Tool for Corporate Sustainability

This paper represents the attempt to define a methodology that can evaluate the degree to which companies' information systems correspond to needs determined by the objectives of sustainability the firm imposes on itself. The result is the creation of a general model which define the correct approach to evaluating information systems – a model which should be adapted to the specificity of each single company which intends to adopt it. In the chart indicated, we obviously have not considered activities connected to the implementation of the survey system, which are particular to each company's situation. The first part of the paper consists of an overall introduction to the approach that has been used to assess the (MIS) of Granarolo, one of the Italian companies involved. The case study contains a profile of the company, the analysis of its MIS referred to the three dimensions of sustainability, and an evaluation of the strong points and issues to be developed. This approach to evaluate the gap between desired requirements of an information system for sustainability and current data available in a firm, has proved its consistency and usefulness. It helps to understand where data are, which dimensions, spheres, stakeholders account for and what is the level of integration between different information systems existing in the firm.     

A model of benefit and tax share discrimination by a monopoly bureau

This paper integrates the theory of demand for publicly provided goods in a democracy with the theory of bureaucratic supply in order to develop a model of benefit share and tax share discrimination by a monopoly bureau. The demand side of the political market is based on a utility maximizing model of voter behavior with voters' demands aggregated through a majority voting process. The supply side of the political market is based on a budget maximizing model of bureaucratic behavior. The bureau is assumed to possess monopoly power as a result of either its control over benefit shares or tax shares and, hence, implicit tax prices or its control over budget proposals placed on the agenda. Different degrees of discrimination are examined and in each case the equilibrium of the model yields a total budget for the bureau as well as distributions of benefit shares or tax shares across voters.     

Are employers pursuing value-based purchasing?

Some employers have begun to undertake a variety of initiatives, collectively termed value-based purchasing (VBP), which aim at factoring quality into the purchasing decision-making process when negotiating costs with providers and insurers. There is evidence that the VBP movement has begun gaining momentum; yet it is unclear whether employers are firmly committed to VBP principles. By surveying a national sample of employers, this study investigates the extent to which employers are currently engaged in VBP activities and also increases our understanding of barriers hampering the broader implementation of these activities.     

Can incentives mitigate student overconfidence at grade forecasts?

Research shows that college students exhibit bias in their forecasts of exam performance. Most students are overconfident in their forecasts, academically weaker students are the most overconfident, and top-performing students are underconfident. The literature identifies negative repercussions of these biases, including inadequate preparation for exams. A recurring attribute of this literature is the absence of meaningful incentives for students to forecast accurately. We implement an extra credit scheme to incentivize accurate forecasts. Depending on how forecast bias is measured, the scheme mitigates bias by top-performing students and marginally mitigates bias by other students. Our results have several implications. First, we illustrate an extra credit tool instructors can use to incentivize students to make more thoughtful assessments of their future exam performance. Second, we show how the association between incentives and forecast bias differs across student groups. Finally, we show that results in this literature are sensitive to how bias is measured.     

Are Mainstream and Heterodox Economists Different? An Empirical Analysis

We explore the differences between mainstream and heterodox economists based on the responses to a questionnaire from a representative sample of Italian economists. Using different definitions for mainstream and heterodox economics, we compare the individual and academic characteristics of the economists belonging to these groups. We measure the within and between disagreement for each group and we test whether belonging to one or the other group predicts differences in economists' opinions on economic policy. Results show that: 1) mainstream and heterodox economists differ as to individual and academic characteristics and political views; 2) the disagreement within heterodox economics is lower than within mainstream economics; 3) some of commonly used ways of grouping heterodox and mainstream schools of thought have little explicative power in relation to individual opinions; 4) on critical economic policies, the opinions of heterodox and mainstream economists are significantly different even after controlling for a number of individual characteristics, including political opinions.