首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   6289篇
  免费   218篇
  国内免费   1篇
财政金融   1163篇
工业经济   421篇
计划管理   1031篇
经济学   1481篇
综合类   96篇
运输经济   77篇
旅游经济   75篇
贸易经济   1150篇
农业经济   314篇
经济概况   668篇
信息产业经济   1篇
邮电经济   31篇
  2023年   45篇
  2022年   42篇
  2021年   74篇
  2020年   128篇
  2019年   170篇
  2018年   201篇
  2017年   237篇
  2016年   218篇
  2015年   154篇
  2014年   249篇
  2013年   716篇
  2012年   297篇
  2011年   286篇
  2010年   260篇
  2009年   286篇
  2008年   225篇
  2007年   201篇
  2006年   172篇
  2005年   155篇
  2004年   141篇
  2003年   119篇
  2002年   110篇
  2001年   122篇
  2000年   122篇
  1999年   89篇
  1998年   89篇
  1997年   92篇
  1996年   78篇
  1995年   60篇
  1994年   66篇
  1993年   65篇
  1992年   69篇
  1991年   63篇
  1990年   57篇
  1989年   41篇
  1988年   50篇
  1987年   40篇
  1986年   43篇
  1985年   58篇
  1984年   62篇
  1983年   75篇
  1982年   57篇
  1981年   52篇
  1980年   54篇
  1979年   48篇
  1978年   53篇
  1977年   43篇
  1976年   43篇
  1975年   39篇
  1973年   40篇
排序方式: 共有6508条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
Journal of Business Ethics - Prior studies suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms have higher ethical standards. In this study, we examine whether the ethical...  相似文献   
3.
This paper develops a two‐sector model of trade in goods and intermediate tasks that differ in tradability and skill intensity. A skill‐abundant country with high productivity is shown to offshore more unskilled tasks than skilled tasks, without relying on a particular correlation structure between tradability and skill intensity. With putty‐clay technology that allows retraining in the long run, transition from the non‐offshoring to the offshoring equilibrium generates wage and employment effects that switch from negative to positive as tradability declines, with the switches occurring at a higher degree of tradability for skilled tasks. This is consistent with the empirical literature.  相似文献   
4.
5.
This study endeavors to enhance political marketing literature about the impact of lobbying on firm performance. Our sample is composed of 140 U.S. firms and spans the years 2007–2014 to encompass the 2007–2009 recession and the subsequent recovery period. Our findings indicate that lobbying expenses positively contribute to firm performance. Also, government contracts in both ways, dollar amount and number of government contracts, act as mediators between lobbying expenses and firm performance. In addition, organizational slack moderates the relationship between lobbying expenses and government contracts. The managerial implications suggest that lobbying expenses can be leveraged as a potent tool for firm performance. Firms with larger lobbying efforts acquired both, higher dollar amounts and a greater number of government contracts.  相似文献   
6.
Journal of Financial Services Marketing - Purpose: The aim of this paper is to evaluate the success of a value proposition over time, considering two aspects: customer’s perceived value and...  相似文献   
7.
Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.  相似文献   
8.
Open Economies Review - Building upon a Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate model, estimated at a quarterly frequency since 1999 on a broad sample of 57 countries, this paper assesses both the...  相似文献   
9.
10.
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号