Optimum currency areas and the European experience

Across nations or regions, the debate on optimum exchange rate cum monetary policies is not yet resolved on three levels. First is the optimum domain of fixed exchange rates versus keeping them flexible. Second is the subordinate debate on whether one needs full monetary union (as in continental Europe) to secure an optimum currency area's internal domain; or, whether virtually fixed exchange rates — where national currencies remain in circulation — can be sufficient. Third is whether a regional grouping of economies with close trade ties (as in East Asia) gain by collectively pegging to an outside currency such as the US dollar. Using an axiomatic approach, which limits the set of cross‐country financial claims to what is feasible, I analyse how best to both share and reduce macroeconomic risks on these three levels. JEL classification: F31, F36.     

Exploring the future for pensions pillarisation

The pensions pillarisation agenda envisages a reduction in the role of social insurance while simultaneously advocating the parallel expansion of fully funded private sector, occupational and personal retirement contingencies. Widespread perception of looming state failure in the field of pensions delivery highlights the inherent limitations of current pension delivery arrangements. However, moves to de-emphasise the provision afforded by, predominantly, monopillar state-mandated pension systems by expanding private privision represent short-term palliative responses to deep rooted structural and demographic problems. Multipillar systems appear no more capable of guaranteeing system funding in the face of demographic ageing and structural unemployment than existing monopillar systems. Moreover, a diminished role for social insurance will leave the low paid and unemployed significantly more vulnerable in old age. Consequently, this paper argues for a pension reform agenda which, in terms of levels of income substitution, will secure an adequate social insurance element into the future.     

为什么中国的汇率要钉住美元：基于日元的历史分析

从1994年到2005年7月21日，中国把其汇率固定在1美元兑换8．28元人民币的水平。此后的人民币汇率机制改革使得人民币汇率在严格控制下开始小幅升值。由于中国的劳动生产率增长相当迅速，贸易盈余持续增长，并积累了大量美元外汇储备。这引发了美国的“排华风潮”，并强烈要求人民币进一步升值。尽管人民币升值并不能降低中国的贸易盈余，但人民币升值的威胁将降低中国的名义利率——1978—1995年的“排日风潮”和日元升值就是如此。日元过度升值引起的通货紧缩，加之零利率的流动性陷阱，造成了20世纪90年代成为日本的“失去的十年”，在新千年里，这同样可能在中国重演。     

Foreign trade regimes and economic development: A review article

How does protection by means of import quotas (QRs) differ from tariffs in ten typical less developed countries? Bhagwati provides a convincing taxonomy, for stalic equilibria, of the manifold additional distortions arising from QR regimes. Krueger analyzes the monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate problems associated with the struggle to liberalize. Both demonstrate that QRs on foreign trade are very damaging to economic development, but neither rationalizes why QRs are so common in practice. The reviewer fills part of the gap by appealing to malfunctioning capital markets, and these financial considerations may help explain why devaluations in LDCs have such unexpected outcomes.     

Hoarding behavior among consumers: Conceptualization and marketing implications

In the western world, and in the United States in particular, there has been an abundance of food, materials and fuel over the past several decades. However, many futurists suggest this condition will soon change and a wide range of scarcities will result. Conditions in underdeveloped countries suggest one probable reaction to shortages in hoarding. In light of the predicted shortages this paper (1) develops definition and conceptualization of what constitutes hoarding, and (2) examines the influence hoarding activities have on channel decisions. An overriding purpose of the paper is to generate interest and research into the topic before conditions necessitate that concern.     

Exchange Rate or Wage Changes in International Adjustment？ Japan and China versus the United States

I. IntroductionSeldom have the pages of the financial press in Europe and America been so full of graveeditorializing on the need for a major depreciation of the dollar to correct the “unsustainable”current account and trade deficits of the United States. Much of this international moralizingdirects the high-growth East Asian countries to stop pegging their currencies to the dollar– or, in China’s case, to allow a large appreciation of the renminbi before moving to unrestrictedfloating.…     

The Foreign Exchange Origins of Japan's Economic Slump and Low Interest Liquidity Trap

Japan's macroeconomic problem has yet to be properly diagnosed. Throughout the 1990s, policy makers could not decide on the proper macro economic measures to combat the country's severe economic slump. We propose a unified explanation, with deep historical roots, of why aggregate private demand failed to recover after Japan's stock and real estate bubbles burst in 1991 and deflationary pressure continues. The problem is not purely ‘made in Japan’. It arises from Japan's unbalanced mercantile relationship with the United States. Starting in the early 1970s, numerous trade disputes between the two countries created tensions that were (temporarily) resolved by the yen going ever higher against the dollar up to 1995. In the last two decades, this persistent pressure for the yen to rise was further aggravated by Japan's large current‐account (saving) surpluses as the counterpart of America's large current account (saving) deficits. The legacy is the expectation that trade and financial tensions will recur so that the yen will be higher 10, 20, or 30 years from now –with Japan's (wholesale) price level forced correspondingly lower and nominal interest rates on yen assets remaining more than four percentage points less than those on dollar assets. This fear of yen appreciation, whose timing is erratic and unpredictable, now inhibits private domestic investment by both Japanese firms and households. Our theory also explains why, in the late 1990s, nominal interest rates on short‐term yen assets were compressed toward zero so as to destroy the normal profit margins of the banking system. In this liquidity trap, the Bank of Japan –whose monetary policy has been quite ‘expansionary’–is powerless to stimulate the flagging economy. To spring the liquidity trap, eliminate deflationary pressure, and restore macro economic balance in Japan, the American and Japanese governments must act jointly to quash the expectation that the yen will be higher in the future than it is today.