Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis

We develop an economic model of crime and search that allowsus to analyze the effects of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionaryrule on crime and privacy. We find that the rule always increasescrime but has two opposing effects on searches. It directlyreduces searches by reducing the chances that they lead to successfulconviction, but it also indirectly increases them by increasingcrime. If its indirect effect dominates, the rule actually increasessearches and has an ambiguous effect on wrongful searches. Ifits direct effect dominates, it reduces wrongful searches, therebyprotecting privacy. Its direct effect is more likely to dominatethe greater is the number of police officers per capita, thelower is the police's incentive to simply close cases and themore accountable the police are for their mistakes. Police accountabilityalso increases crime but unambiguously reduces wrongful searches.We also explore the effects of long-term progress in searchtechnology on crime and privacy.     

Multi-activity contests

In many contests, players can influence their chances of winning through multiple activities or “arms”. We develop a model of multi-armed contests and axiomatize its contest success function. We then analyze the outcomes of the multi-armed contest and the effects of allowing or restricting arms. Restricting an arm increases total effort directed to other arms if and only if restricting the arm balances the contest. Restricting an arm tends to reduce rent dissipation because it reduces the discriminatory power of the contest. But it also tends to increase rent dissipation if it balances the contest. Less rent is dissipated if an arm is restricted as long as no player is excessively stronger than the other with that arm. If players are sufficiently symmetric in an arm, both players are better off if that arm is restricted. Nevertheless, players cannot agree to restrict the arm if their costs of using the arm are sufficiently low.     

Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests*

We develop a model of dynamic multi‐activity contests. Players simultaneously choose efforts in long‐run activities, observe each other's efforts in these activities, and then simultaneously choose efforts in short‐run activities. A player's long‐run and short‐run efforts complement each other in determining the player's probability of winning. We compare the outcomes of this two‐stage model to those of the corresponding model in which players choose efforts in all activities simultaneously. Interestingly, effort expenditures are always lower in the sequential multi‐activity contest than in the simultaneous multi‐activity contest. The implications of this result for the organization of military, litigation, innovation, academic, and sporting contests are highlighted.     

Violence against women, social learning, and deterrence

We develop a simple model of sexual and domestic violence. By assumption, the potential victim’s threat to report if she is victimized is not credible, which implies that the only sequential equilibrium involves violence. However, a realistic social learning process converges to a non-sequential equilibrium without violence from all nearby states if the expected punishment for offenders whose victims report to the police is sufficiently high. A policy to increase the sentences for sexual and domestic violence convictions could therefore substantially reduce such violence in the long run, even if it is powerless to make women’s threats to report credible.