CORRUPTION AND MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES: DOES REGULATION HELP?

Misunderstandings about the structure of microcredit interest rates continue to generate rich criticism of the industry's high interest rates. Research has focused attention on the cost structure of interest rates and, more recently, on macroeconomic and macro‐institutional factors. While the cost structure is probably the most important determinant of interest rates, other factors also matter. In addition to other important results that usually validate the empirical literature, this paper finds that microcredit interest rates respond positively to corruption. The analysis shows that there is asymmetry between the effects of corruption, depending on whether or not the MFIs are regulated. While corruption has a positive and significant impact on interest rates of unregulated MFIs, it has a negligible impact on interest rates of regulated MFIs.     

Does the Group Leader Affect Repayment Performance Differently?

Theoretical models of group lending assume that all group members are identical in terms of their effect on repayment performance. In practice, however, this may not be true. We use a unique data set obtained from a survey of 160 borrowing groups in Jordan to investigate the impact of joint liability, screening and monitoring activities, and social ties of the group leader and other group members on repayment performance as measured by the intensity of default using a negative binomial II model. Our results suggest that the joint liability and screening activities of the leader are more strongly related to repayment performance than the same variables for the rest of the group members. Social ties of all members have a significant effect on repayment, while monitoring activities have no effect.     

An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy

Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs associated with the principal/agent relationship. Distributing resources in the form of cash dividends forces managers to seek outside capital, thus causing them to reduce agency costs as they subject themselves to the scrutiny of the capital marketplace. Under this scenario the optimum level of dividend payout is that which minimizes the agency cost structure relative to the cost of raising needed funds. A test of this theory employing time-series cross-sectional analysis and more direct measures of the agency cost structure shows that these tenets of agency theory may be valid. Managers do appear to adjust the dividend payout in response to the agency cost/transaction cost structure, both through time as well as across firms.     

Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan

Using data from a survey of 160 urban borrowing groups of the Microfund for Women in Jordan, we investigate the effect of screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing groups' repayment behavior as an indirect test of different theoretical models. The dependent variable used captures the intensity of default measured by the total number of days of late repayment after each due date, allowing us to use count data models with cluster standard errors. As theory predicts, our empirical analysis suggests that peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties reduce delinquency. The paper uncovers interesting evidence about the role of social ties and religion. Most notably, in an area where religion contributes to attitudes and beliefs of individuals, we find that religiosity improves repayment performance.     

The Impact of Ownership Structure On Corporate Debt Policy: a Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis

This study examines the influence of agency costs and ownership concentration on the capital structure of the firm. Of particular interest is the composition of equity ownership as a determinant of overall capital structure and the dynamic adjustment of capital structure to changes in the equity ownership. Results indicate that the distribution of equity ownership is important in explaining overall capital structure and that managers do reduce the level of debt as their own wealth is increasingly tied to the firm. It is also noted that the time-series component is important in resolving the conflicting results reported in prior research.     

Financing microfinance institutions: subsidies or deposit mobilisation

According to conventional wisdom, dependence on subsidies cannot achieve the double bottom lines of microfinance institutions (MFIs): outreach and financial sustainability. The application of market-based principles to microfinancing, such as deposit mobilisation, has been long suggested as an answer to this problem. This paper documents the following findings regarding this issue. First, deposit mobilisation crowds out subsidies. Second, subsidies and deposit mobilisation reduce microcredit interest rates and allow MFIs to reach poorer borrowers. Third, subsidies and deposit mobilisation worsen financial sustainability. Fourth, subsidies reduce repayment rates, while deposit mobilisation has no impact on repayment. Overall, the results suggest that neither subsidies nor deposit mobilisation solve the traditional problem of trade-off between outreach and financial sustainability.