Islamic corporate financing: does it promote profit and loss sharing?

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non‐participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non‐financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non‐financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e. risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral‐hazard‐risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk‐sharing more than the controversial rent‐seeking practice.     

Is executive compensation a substitute governance mechanism to debt financing and leasing?

This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt and leases). Using manually collected CEO compensation and lease data for a sample of large UK firms, we found evidence of a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We also found that CEO equity incentives and leases are negatively related. The results are consistent with the theory introduced in this study on the substitutability of executive compensation and firm’s debt/lease financing. Our findings represent fresh empirical evidence and renewed interpretation regarding the relationship between executive equity-based incentives and firm’s financing choices. The substitutability theory we introduced here suggests that firms with greater use of debt and/or leases will implement less equity-based compensation in mitigating the agency cost of equity.