Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality

The author argues that increased foreign competition can affect technical choice and skill differentials even when actual imports do not rise significantly. A model is presented of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) in which a reduction in import barriers (whether technological or policy–imposed) encourages more strategic investment by incumbent firms. The predictions accord with many of the stylized facts: higher skill premia; higher ratios of skilled to unskilled workers employed in all sectors and throughout the economy; little change in import volumes or prices; and rapid technological progress with rather little change in total factor productivity.     

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

A non-co-operative bargaining model of membership expansion in a producer co-operative

This paper presents a non-co-operative bargaining model of membership expansion in a producer co-operative. The emphasis is on examining the distribution of the resulting surplus between the existing partners and the new member. In the presence of a number of alternative candidates, the existing partners can use the threat of switching negotiating partners to extract additional surplus from the negotiations. The degree of symmetry between the competing candidates necessary for these threats to be credible is specified, as is the nature of the dependence of the parties' payoffs on the various parameters of the model. Potential sources of misallocation within the model are identified.     

The effect of social distancing on the reach of an epidemic in social networks

How does social distancing affect the reach of an epidemic in social networks? We present Monte Carlo simulation results of a susceptible–infected–removed with social distancing model. The key feature of the model is that individuals are limited in the number of acquaintances that they can interact with, thereby constraining disease transmission to an infectious subnetwork of the original social network. While increased social distancing typically reduces the spread of an infectious disease, the magnitude varies greatly depending on the topology of the network, indicating the need for policies that are network dependent. Our results also reveal the importance of coordinating policies at the ‘global’ level. In particular, the public health benefits from social distancing to a group (e.g. a country) may be completely undone if that group maintains connections with outside groups that are not following suit.

     

The theory of household behaviour under rationing

This paper simplifies and extends the theory of household behaviour under rationing, using duality and the concept of ‘virtual’ prices. Slutsky-type equations, decomposing the derivatives of the rationed demand functions into income and substitution effects, are derived, and these derivatives are related to the corresponding derivatives of the unrationed demand functions for finite as well as infinitesimal ration levels. The results imply that the Keynesian demand multiplier is more likely but the Barro Grossman supply multiplier is less likely to exceed unity the further the household is from its unconstrained equilibrium.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries

This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the "concertina rule" for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs but not moves towards uniformity and particularly not increases in low tariffs. I show that the basic principles of tariff reform are the same in unilateral, multilateral and customs union contexts. Finally, I suggest that the theory of strategic trade policy does not justify subsidies to high-technology industries.     

R&D spillovers and the case for industrial policy in an open economy

In this paper we consider the case for subsidies towards firmswhich generate R&D spillovers in open economies. We showthat in the presence of strategic behaviour by firms many expectedresults are overturned. Local R&D spillovers to other domesticfirms may justify an R&D tax rather than a subsidy; R&Dcooperation by local firms over-internalises the externalityand also justifies an R&D tax; and international spilloverswhich benefit foreign firms may justify a subsidy, even thoughthe government cares only about the profits of home firms.     

Robust rules for industrial policy open economies

The theory of strategic trade policy yields ambiguous recommendations for assistance to exporting firms in oligopolistic industries. However, some writers have suggested that investment subsidies are a more robust recommendation than export subsidies. We show that, although ambiguous in principle, the case for investment subsidies is reasonably robust in practice. Except when functional forms exhibit arbitrary nonlinearities, it holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, with either costreducing or market-expanding investment, and with or without spillovers. Only if firms have strong asymmetries in their investment behaviour and engage in Bertrand competition is an investment tax clearly justified.     

Putting the "New" into New Trade Theory: Paul Krugman's Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics

This paper reviews the scientific contributions of Paul Krugman to the study of international trade, on the occasion of his receipt of the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. A simplified exposition is presented of some of his principal findings, including: the effects of trade on firm scale and product diversity in a general model of monopolistic competition; the integration of monopolistic competition with factor endowments theory; the implications of transport costs, including home-market effects and the possibility of agglomeration in models of economic geography; and the positive and normative consequences of oligopolistic trade.