Does Policy Instability Matter for International Equity Markets?

We test whether policy risk is systematically priced in equity returns across 49 countries from 1995 to 2013. We construct two global policy risk factors based on the ratings from international country risk guide. They capture the policy risk from government instability (GOVLMH) and the quality of bureaucracy (BURLMH). Both factors are significantly and positively related to equity returns and the BURLMH factor carries a monthly risk premium of 65 basis points. A country with weaker economic and institutional conditions has more risk exposure to the BURLMH factor whereas a country with high democracy has more risk exposure to the GOVLMH factor. Overall, our study reveals the importance and complexity of policy risk in international equity markets.     

Implications of Regulation Policy Incentives for Strategic Control: An Integrative Model

Abstract ** : This paper proposes an internal management perspective of the company, as a complement to longstanding principal‐agency theory, for understanding the interchange between regulator and company. It draws from a longitudinal research project on understanding the implications of regulation policy incentives for strategic control in the management of UK monopoly network utilities and the management implications of regulatory policy making. This paper reports on how two utility companies have managed regulatory objectives alongside organizational ones in electricity distribution and gas transportation and suggests a new integrative model of strategic control for understanding utility management. It concludes if regulation policies are to be effective then regulators should understand the internal management of the companies if performance targets are to be attained .     

Cultural Political Economy: Logics of Discovery,Epistemic Fallacies,the Complexity of Emergence,and the Potential of the Cultural Turn

As a result of a long-running internal debate there have been notable incremental changes to how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) treats capital controls, particularly those directed at inflows. These changes combine new acceptance of these policy instruments with an older emphasis on their negative consequences and on the desirability of free movement of capital. Policy change of this sort is puzzling from the standpoint of the existing literature on international organisations (IOs), which has thus far paid little attention to transformative incremental change associated with long-term contestation. This article departs from this tendency by drawing on insights from principal–agent theory, constructivism and historical institutionalism to identify the conditions under which such change may originate. I argue that actors within IOs are likely to pursue incremental change by layering new policies on to old ones as a way to build coalitions and to respond to external organisational insecurity imperatives and diverse member state preferences and to internal path-dependent organisational cultural features. Over time the incremental shifts brought by layering can induce transformative rather than reproductive change because they fit with consequentialist and appropriateness behavioural logics. I illustrate this argument by investigating recent changes in IMF policy on capital controls.     

The Norm Theory of Capital Structure: International Evidence*

Akerlof proposes that the norms of decision makers can bridge the gap between New Classical economic theories and conflicting empirical evidence. We apply his framework to cross‐country capital structure decision making and propose a norm theory of capital structure. Consistent with its predictions, we find that two principal components that represent the manager–subordinate relationship and the manager–environment relationship in a national culture are significantly and negatively related to the median leverage ratio at the country level. This study is among the first to provide a direct link between national culture and capital structure as made operational through managerial norms.     

Enhancing the competitiveness and sustainability of social enterprises in Hong Kong: A three-dimensional analysis

Running a social enterprise (SE) is more difficult than running a small or medium-sized enterprise because SEs have to achieve both economic sustainability as business enterprises and their social mission for the benefit of society. After a few years of operation, many SEs fail or struggle for survival. In this study, we examine some of the factors that affect an SE’s profitability, financial management, and business planning and management. Based on in-depth interviews with 22 social enterprises in Hong Kong, we find that SEs with the dual investment objectives of social mission and financial return are more sustainable and competitive than SEs with social impact as their sole objective. Furthermore, SEs managed by non-owner managers have better financial planning and performance than those managed by owner managers. In addition, SEs with an oversight/advisory committee are more competitive and have better management practices than those without such a committee. Our findings have policy implications for government, SEs, funding bodies, and non-profit organizations to enhance and promote the development of the social enterprise sector.     

On the calibration of mortality forward curves

In 2007, a major investment bank launched a product called “q‐forward,” which may be regarded as a forward contract on a mortality rate. The pricing of mortality forwards is similar to the pricing of other forward‐rate contracts, such as interest‐rate forwards or foreign exchange forwards. In particular, since investors require compensation to take on longevity risk, the forward mortality rate at which q‐forward contracts will trade will be smaller than the expected mortality rate. The relationship between the forward rate and the time to maturity is called a mortality forward curve. In this study, we contribute a method for calibrating mortality forward curves. This method consists of two parts, one of which is the generation of the distribution of future mortality rates, and the other of which is the transformation of the distribution into its risk‐neutral counterpart, using the idea of canonical valuation developed by Stutzer, M. ( 1996 ). To illustrate the method, mortality forward curves for English and Welsh males are calibrated. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark     

Feature review

Small is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens

Wilfred Beckerman

(Duckworth, 1995)     

Optimization of the facility location-allocation problem in a customer-driven supply chain

This paper develops and applies an integrated multiple criteria decision making approach to optimize the facility location-allocation problem in the contemporary customer-driven supply chain. Unlike the traditional optimization techniques, the proposed approach, combining the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and the goal programming (GP) model, considers both quantitative and qualitative factors, and also aims at maximizing the benefits of deliverer and customers. In the integrated approach, the AHP is used first to determine the relative importance weightings or priorities of alternative locations with respect to both deliverer oriented and customer oriented criteria. Then, the GP model, incorporating the constraints of system, resource, and AHP priority is formulated to select the best locations for setting up the warehouses without exceeding the limited available resources. In this paper, a real case study is used to demonstrate how the integrated approach can be applied to deal with the facility location-allocation problem, and it is proved that the integrated approach outperforms the traditional cost-based approach.     

Putting the ‘Amsterdam School’ in its Rightful Place: A Reply to Juan Ignacio Staricco’s Critique of Cultural Political Economy

This article responds to Staricco’s critique of cultural political economy (CPE) for being inherently constructivist because of its emphasis on the ontologically foundational role of semiosis (sense- and meaning-making) in social life. Staricco recommends the Amsterdam School of transnational historical materialism as a more immediately productive and insightful approach to developing a regulationist critique of political economy. Both lines of criticism of CPE are addressed. First, Staricco misinterprets the implications of treating semiosis and structuration as ontologically equal bases of social life. Second, Staricco mistakes our criticisms of the ‘Italian School’ in international political economy for criticisms of the Amsterdam School – an approach we have always warmly endorsed. He therefore misses our more nuanced claim that while the Amsterdam School emphasises the importance of semiosis, it has fewer concepts to explain how semiosis matters and why only some imagined class identities and concepts of control are selected, retained, and institutionalised. CPE addresses this lacuna by integrating critical semiotic analysis into political economy. Third, we provide the first detailed comparison of the Amsterdam School and CPE to provide a better understanding of the merits of each approach and to indicate where they might complement each other without claiming one to be superior to the other.