The Economic Value of Volatility Timing

Numerous studies report that standard volatility models have low explanatory power, leading some researchers to question whether these models have economic value. We examine this question by using conditional mean-variance analysis to assess the value of volatility timing to short-horizon investors. We find that the volatility timing strategies outperform the unconditionally efficient static portfolios that have the same target expected return and volatility. This finding is robust to estimation risk and transaction costs.     

Talk as Technique – A Critique of the Words and Deeds Distinction in the Diffusion of Customer Service Cultures in Call Centres

ABSTRACT   This paper critically explores the common distinction made between words and deeds (or ideas and techniques) in the diffusion of management knowledge literature. The concern with whether management ideas are really being implemented in an organizational context intuitively points to the possibility of a contrast between simply talking about a practice or 'hype' and practical implementation. Drawing on empirical research on the diffusion of customer service culture in two call centres where 'verbal labour' predominates, it is argued that this distinction is important, but overdrawn. Eschewing discursive reductionism, the concepts of 'talk in work' and 'talk about work' are developed to illustrate how talk can be a technique of implementation in its own right.     

Risk Aversion, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change

The paper investigates a climate-economy model with an iso-elastic welfare function in which one parameter measures relative risk-aversion and a distinct parameter measures resistance to intertemporal substitution.We show both theoretically and numerically that climate policy responds differently to variations in the two parameters. In particular, we show that higher but lower leads to increase emissions control. We also argue that climate-economy models based on intertemporal expected utility maximization, i.e. models where = , may misinterpret the sensitivity of the climate policy to risk-aversion.     

Central Bank's interventions and the Fisher hypothesis: a threshold cointegration investigation

The long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation is examined, allowing for structural breaks and asymmetric mean reversion. From a Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) test applied to the residuals of the cointegration relationship (while allowing for both a break in the mean of the long-run equation and a smooth regime-transition), there is strong evidence for non-linear mean reversion properties for the real interest rates of the US Treasury Bill market. This suggests asymmetric changes to inflation shocks in the Central Bank's reaction function. The existence of different regimes is consistent with some interpretations of the monetary policies run by the Fed, such as credibility and opportunism.     

Parallel Neutrality

This paper develops the notion of parallel-neutral technical change for inputs and outputs. It is shown that parallel-neutral technical change generalizes existing radial notions of neutral technical change. A taxonomy of the structural consequences of parallel-neutral technical change is developed.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

A Closer Look at the Relation between GARCH and Stochastic Autoregressive Volatility

We show that, for three common SARV models, fitting a minimummean square linear filter is equivalent to fitting a GARCH model.This suggests that GARCH models may be useful for filtering,forecasting, and parameter estimation in stochastic volatilitysettings. To investigate, we use simulations to evaluate howthe three SARV models and their associated GARCH filters performunder controlled conditions and then we use daily currency andequity index returns to evaluate how the models perform in arisk management application. Although the GARCH models produceless precise forecasts than the SARV models in the simulations,it is not clear that the performance differences are large enoughto be economically meaningful. Consistent with this view, wefind that the GARCH and SARV models perform comparably in testsof conditional value-at-risk estimates using the actual data.     

Issues in decentralizing the provision of education

This paper analyzes some of the problems that arise in decentralizing education to the private sector. We concentrate on the difficulties that result from the heterogeneity of students and competition among schools in a location setting. We analyze two main issues, the resources expended by schools and the mix of students in schools, and report on results for two others, the location of schools and their number. For each of these, we investigate the extent to which decentralizing the provision of schooling results in an efficient allocation of resources, and consider the use of vouchers to improve the situation. Our analysis draws on elements of three distinct methodologies: the theory of clubs, location theory, and the theory of monopolistic competition. We find that private schooling will typically be inefficient, but that inefficiency may sometimes be corrected by appropriately designed vouchers.We would like to thank Olivier Debande, Jean-François Wen, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the 1st meeting of the Canadian Public Economics Study Group and the 51 st congress of the International Institute of Public Finance for helpful comments. Stefan Buergi and Luc Savard provided useful research assistance. We are also grateful to the SSHRCC and the FCAR for financial support.     

Are financial constraints of corporate activist investors perceived negatively?

This paper shows that financial constraints of corporate activist investors are negatively perceived by the market. By conducting an event study on a sample of 561 Schedule 13(D) filings disclosed by US corporations in the years 1996–2016, abnormal share price reactions in the [?10, \(+\)3] event window are about 10.8% lower for targets of financially constrained corporate investors. The average abnormal return for all targets is equal to 13.4%. This positive market response suggests that activism results in actual value improvement for the target. Yet, our analyses show that value improvements crucially depend on the investor’s access to external financing.