The cournot-nash and cooperative solutions in the harvesting of a fish stock

The questions of optimal extinction and of market imperfections in the harvesting of a fish stock is analyzed using two different objective functions, one discounted utility of fish consumption and the other discounted profit, both over an infinite horizon.     

Monopoly,intermediate goods and the pure theory of international trade

Conclusion In a model with two traded good sectors between which intersectoral flows of intermediate goods are allowed and with a monopolized non-traded good sector, the wage rate in terms of two traded goods increases and the rental of capital in terms of two traded goods decreases when the price of relatively more labor intensive traded good sector increases, though nothing definite can be said about the direction of change in the wage rate and rental in terms of the non-traded good. When prices of traded goods are kept constant and labor and/or capital increase(s), output of the non-traded good sector increases provided that the non-traded good is not inferior, having income elasticity of demand less than unity. The factor intensity condition for the traded goods is in general not sufficient for the validity of the Rybczynski theorem to hold with respect to net outputs of the traded goods. We have derived sufficient conditions for the magnification effect to be observed with respect to net outputs of the traded good sectors. Specifically, we have shown that the factor intensity condition (23) is sufficient for the magnification effect to prevail when only labor increases.     

Matrices with dominant diagonal blocks and economic theory

In this paper we shall define matrices with quasi-strictly-dominant diagonal blocks or quasi-dominant diagonal blocks on the basis of general matrix norms including the spectral norm. Several theorems on such matrices are derived and a simple numerical example and economic models are considered to apply our theorems.     

Quasi-Competitive Cournot Oligopoly with Product Differentiation and Symmetric Firms

Since Vives (1984 ), Cheng (1985 ) and Okuguchi (1987 ), the equilibria in Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation have been known to differ. Okuguchi (2005 ) has shown that Bertrand price‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms is quasi‐competitive but not perfectly competitive in the limit state of infinite number of firms. This paper formulates and analyzes two types of Cournot output‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms, in one of which symmetric firms producing the same goods are assumed to collude, and in the other, collusion is ruled out. The limit states are shown to be different in two oligopolies but they are both quasi‐competitive.     

CHANGES IN DEMAND FUNCTION IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

Abstract.  The effects of change in the market (inverse) demand function are systematically analysed for Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation. The general comparative-static results are stated using the original data on firms' cost functions and inverse demand function. Three special models are examined in light of our results. The stability condition is shown to be insufficient for determinate comparative statics.