UNIFORM TECHNICAL PROGRESS: CAN IT BE HARMFUL?

Abstract.  In a model incorporating trade in final goods, intermediate goods and capital, we show how 'uniform' technical progress across sectors can lead to immiserization. The condition for immiserizing technical progress crucially depends on the pattern of specialization. Our results tend to hold in a more general specification of the basic structure.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,NON‐TRADED GOODS AND REAL WAGES

Using a three‐sector general equilibrium model with non‐traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions.     

Is Regionalism Viable? A Case for Global Free Trade

We assume an imperfectly competitive world with n commodities and address the question of whether or not (regional) trade blocs are viable. To answer this fundamental question, we use a notion of stability, offered by Greenberg (1990) , and show that regional trade blocs are not viable as they are not stable. On the other hand, we demonstrate that a global trade bloc is viable. Therefore, our results provide theoretical support for advocates of global free trade.     

An elementary proposition on technical progress and non-traded goods

We explore the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined range of non-traded goods by using a Ricardian model with continuum of goods. By defining technical progress on the basis of proportional changes in the relative productivity across sectors, we show that the range of non-traded goods decreases if technical progress is unbiased or if it is biased toward the goods that a country has more comparative advantage.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Capital specificity,imperfect labor mobility and growth in developing economies

Labor markets in developing economies may be afflicted by a multiplicity of interacting distortions. We consider a general equilibrium model of an economy distorted by both sector-specific sticky wages and imperfect mobility of labor. In this framework, we contrast the implications of capital accumulation in the short and long run. We show that, in contrast to both the case in the absence of a sector-specific sticky wage and the case in the absence of imperfect labor mobility, the short and long-run effects of growth on the economic system converge as the degree of labor mobility is limited.     

Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions

By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.     

Stable Tariffs and Retaliations*

A two‐country, two‐commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash‐equilibrium, a non‐free‐trade outcome. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the “contingent threat situation” to reformulate tariff retaliations. In this context, we show that the free trade is a stable outcome. More surprisingly, this interesting result is also valid for the “Johnson case,” where one country is better off under the tariff‐ridden Nash equilibrium compared to free trade.     

North–South Trade Liberalization and Economic Welfare

We consider a general equilibrium model of a developing economy (the South) that opens to trade with a developed economy (the North). The southern economy is characterized by open urban unemployment and rural–urban migration, a competitive agricultural sector and a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector. Hence, there is potential for both inter‐ and intra‐industry trade to arise on liberalization, in addition to distortionary effects of duality. Southern comparative advantage in agriculture may arise from the labor market distortion and the basis for intra‐industry trade is love for variety. We characterize various configurations of the trade pattern, and the resulting welfare consequences of opening to trade in this context. We illustrate a new mechanism under which in some circumstances it may be possible for trade liberalization to lower economic welfare in the South.