Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits.
(J.E.L.: E52, G21).     

The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

Aging and Retirement: Evidence Across Countries

How do demographic factors influence retirement? Using a large cross-country data set, I show that in countries with a larger share of elderly in their population the length of retirement is longer. This result holds true if I control for wealth effects, and when the effective labor force participation rate of the elderly is used instead of the official retirement age. Retirement policies and the social security size are strictly related: a new variable, representing the aggregate relevance of retirement policies, turns out to be significant in explaining the size of social security. Finally, the total amount of social security transfers is positively related with the increase of the elderly population, while in per capita terms this relation is not significant.     

Uniqueness of ASM solutions in rational expectations models: An example

Using a technique recently proposed by Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1979) we prove that for a process m_t asymptotically stationary in mean (ASM) the solution for the price level equation proposed in Fischer (1979) and in Blinder and Fischer (1979) is the unique ASM solution.     

The economic burden of tuberous sclerosis complex in UK patients with renal manifestations: a retrospective cohort study in the clinical practice research datalink (CPRD)

Background: Tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC) is a multi-system genetic disorder in which renal manifestations occur in ～50% of children and 80% of adults. Since these often present alongside other manifestations, renal TSC is likely to incur significant costs. This study aims to quantify healthcare resource use (HCRU) and costs for renal TSC patients in the UK.

Methods: TSC patients in the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD) linked to Hospital Episodes Statistics were identified from January 1987–June 2013. Clinical data were extracted over the entire history and costs were reported over the most recent 3-year period. HCRU was compared with a matched comparator cohort. Incremental costs were reported and the key cost drivers by primary manifestation category were identified by regression modeling.

Results: A total of 79 renal TSC patients were identified with manifestations including chronic kidney disease stage 3–5 (with prevalence increasing with age) and renal angiomyolipoma. Renal TSC patients consistently reported greater HCRU than the comparator. Inpatient hospitalizations were more frequent for renal TSC patients (3.2 vs 1.6), but length of stay was comparable; however, 70.9% of renal TSC patients recorded no kidney-related procedures ever and averaged <1 test per year in the 3-year period. Average costs for renal TSC patients were nearly 3-fold greater than the comparator (£15,162 vs £5672). Costs increased with additional manifestation categories (£3600: only renal; £27,531: renal with ≥4 additional manifestation categories [25% of patients]). Additional nervous system and dermatology/psychiatric manifestations significantly (p?Conclusions: Renal TSC patients have greater HCRU than the general CPRD population, likely to result from progression of renal disease and additional manifestations; however, surveillance for disease progression appears to be deficient. Inadequate monitoring may contribute to a lack of co-ordinated care and increased healthcare-associated costs. Efforts should be made to follow the TSC guidelines to effectively monitor and treat patients.     

The role of banks in CESEE countries: exploring non-standard determinants of economic growth

This paper explores the finance–growth nexus in 14 countries from Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe (CESEE) over the 1995–2015 period. It investigates whether including two ‘non-standard’ variables, i.e. a credit cycle dummy and foreign bank relevance, deepens our understanding of the role of a typical financial determinant of economic growth, i.e. bank credit. We find evidence of a negative impact of bank credit on economic growth and the significance of cyclical fluctuations of bank credit. In contrast, a higher market share of loans granted by foreign-owned banks in a cyclical upswing and stock market capitalisation are found to have a proactive effect on growth.     

STABILIZATION POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND

We construct a monetary economy with aggregate liquidity shocks and heterogeneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. In this environment, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound (ZLB) even when the Friedman rule is the best interest‐rate policy the central bank can implement. As a consequence, central bank stabilization policy, which takes the form of repo arrangements in response to aggregate demand shocks, temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of impatient agents at the ZLB. Due to a pecuniary externality, this policy may have beneficial general equilibrium effects for patient agents even if they are unconstrained in their money balances.     

A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems

We examine the role of school grades as a signal of worker productivity under different examination systems in relation to errors that may affect student performance. Firms use school grades as a signal of workers’ effective skills, taking into account that these evaluations are effected by stochastic shocks. We show that more precise evaluation systems, being associated with a higher reactivity of wages to school grades, induce students to provide more effort. Low ability students tend to react less than high ability students. Moreover, individuals with low abilities may prefer less accurate evaluation systems. Nevertheless, when productivity increases, these systems become less convenient and the number of individuals preferring them diminishes. Our analysis highlights an important trade-off between centralised and decentralised evaluation systems. On the one hand, frequent evaluations, typical of decentralised systems, weaken the impact on grades of those errors which influence student performance and, so, reduce signal noise, while, on the other hand, different teachers generally adopt different performance assessment standards, leading to noisier evaluations.     

Courts,scheduled damages,and medical malpractice insurance

We study how the functioning of the judicial system affects the availability and affordability of medical liability insurance, as proxied by the number of insurers and the premiums paid. We use two unique datasets collected in Italy from 2000 to 2010. Using the first dataset—insurance contracts for hospitals—we estimate the average treatment effect of schedules on insurers and premiums paid, conditional on judicial efficiency and proxied by different measures. Our identification rests on the partial overlap between healthcare districts and judicial districts, meaning that the caseload of a court and malpractice events at the healthcare provider level are not perfectly correlated. On average, the adoption of schedules does not produce any significant effect on insurers or on premiums paid. However, adopting schedules has a robust and significant effect on the number of insurers, but only in inefficient courts. We further investigate these findings using a second dataset comprising 17,578 malpractice insurance claims. We find evidence of a composition effect among claims that is triggered by higher levels of judicial inefficiency: As a court’s inefficiency increases, the likelihood for a case to not be decided on the merits decreases and the levels of reserve and recovery per claim decrease.