Location Choice and Contract Bargaining

We study how managerial bargaining power affects outcomes and payoffs in a Hotelling‐type duopoly framework with restricted and unrestricted locations. We show that bargaining power only affects the distribution of the surplus between owners and managers but does not affect the locations, prices, managerial incentives, and consumer welfare. This is in stark contrast to van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) and related contributions where bargaining power has real effects. We argue that the difference between our irrelevance result and their findings originates from the fact that their approach seems to be based on a behavioral assumption and not on microeconomic principles of owner–manager bargaining. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anticipating the location of a waste collection point: an application based on Portugal

Portuguese Economic Journal - We study the optimal location of a waste facility in a horizontally differentiated duopoly where firms choose their location and price. The policymaker decides the...     

R&D Spillovers on a Salop Circle

The paper describes quality/price equilibrium and welfare effects of R&D spillovers when firms are located around the circumference of a Salop circle, and the extent of the spillovers may depend on the geographic proximity between firms. In particular, we show that an increase in competition may have a positive effect on the provision of quality and firms' profits. We also extend the model allowing a multinational enterprise to locate at the centre of the circle. In this scenario it is important to understand the interplay of local R&D spillovers with the spillovers that propagate from and to the centre. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.