We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the PT-source (PT-recipient) country. While PT reduces ex post welfare, improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante. 相似文献
A home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm’s country. Credible signaling to deter counter‐entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports), and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits, uninformative signaling may be welfare‐reducing. Hence, we argue that moderate to high location costs may be socially desirable. We also show that there are not simple monotonic relationships between technology/demand conditions and firms’ entry modes. Thus, the signaling interpretation of international expansion makes it possible to explain some controversial empirical findings on a theoretical ground. 相似文献
We investigate how bundling affects investment in product quality, and derive welfare implications. A monopolist in a primary market competes with a rival in a complementary market. Bundling is the monopolist’s preferred strategy, since it either extracts surplus from the rival’s investment, or forces the rival to provide low quality. Bundling may reduce welfare without foreclosing the rival, but improves welfare when preventing undesirable investment. Since prohibiting bundling is not appropriate, we introduce a price test for bundled offers that preserves efficiencies from both bundling and quality investment, thereby improving welfare relative to the ‘do-nothing’ scenario. We consequently argue that this test should be applied whenever possible. 相似文献
National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are non-linear relationships between technology/market conditions and the first-movers pricing strategy; (ii) public service obligations on distributors allow regulators to manipulate parallel exports so as to improve national welfare; (iii) to prevent sabotage, regulation should provide manufacturers with adequate countervailing incentives; (iv) coordinating national agencies alleviates negative regulatory and market externalities. Therefore, static and dynamic efficiency concerns may arise within a regional exhaustion regime of intellectual property rights.We are grateful to the Editor Michael A. Crew, an anonymous referee, and Luigi Buzzacchi for valuable comments and suggestions. We have benefited from financial support granted by MIUR-FIRB Project MAIS. 相似文献
Airport runways, radio spectrum, and hospital beds are resources with capacity limits used to provide multiple services with specific capacity requirements in separate markets, which contribute to recover capacity investment costs. A welfare-maximizing and (possibly) budget-constrained firm, whose operating costs significantly increase as total capacity use presses against capacity, chooses prices and capacity. When the equilibrium capacity is reached, second-best Ramsey prices must be adjusted, and mark-ups on marginal costs may be higher for services with higher demand elasticities, if they intensively use capacity. Moreover, for a given output vector, the firm invests more than in first best. Instead, the equilibrium capacity may be first best when there is excess capacity to reduce operating costs and thus improve welfare. Our model can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the efficiency of market mechanisms for resource allocation and pricing, or when market mechanisms are not adopted.