排序方式: 共有19条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Sergey V. Popov 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(1):108-125
I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision‐making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the size of an individual bribe might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. Anticorruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation, if they lower the bribe levels demanded and thus encourage small businesses to participate. 相似文献
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V. Popov 《Quantitative Finance》2016,16(10):1615-1630
Using the wick’s difference from the classical Japanese candlestick representation of daily open, high, low, close prices brings efficiency when estimating the correlation in a bivariate Brownian motion. An interpretation of the correlation estimator given in [Rogers, L.C.G. and Zhou, F., Estimating correlation from high, low, opening and closing prices. Ann. Appl. Probab., 2008, 18(2), 813–823] in the light of wicks’ difference allows us to suggest modifications, which lead to an increased efficiency and robustness over the baseline model. An empirical study of four major financial markets confirms the advantages of the modified estimator. 相似文献
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Latchezar Popov 《Economic Theory》2014,57(1):195-222
I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments. 相似文献
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Evgeny V. Popov Victoria L. Simonova 《International Advances in Economic Research》2006,12(1):115-123
The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between
the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between
the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia,
such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental
dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness
of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined.
Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged. 相似文献
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Evgeny V. Popov 《International Advances in Economic Research》2008,14(4):475-476
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Interbank market integration, loan rates, and firm leverage 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the effect of interbank market integration on small firm finance in the build-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to 6047 firms across 14 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process. Our findings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also find that in the most rapidly integrating markets, firms became substantially overleveraged during the build-up to the crisis. 相似文献
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Cornia Giovanni Andrea Popov Vladimir 《MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies》1998,8(1):7-32
MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies - 相似文献