Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries

We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. But interregional targeting may deteriorate, as central grants to high-poverty regions shrink, owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions.     

Institutions matter,but which ones?

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS

In this paper we start with the standard definition of power and indicate how orthodox neoclassical economics fails to handle some of the key issues of power. In Sections II and III we discuss in the context of recent advances in economic theory some of the battlefields, so to speak, for the exercise of power: bargaining games in Section II and economic organizations and capitalist authority relations in Section III. In all of this we focus on the underlying structural factors. In the last Section we discuss some problems with both the behavioral and structural concepts of power.     

A further note on the asymptotic efficiency of friedman’s x r 2 -test

Summary For independently distributed error components, the asymptotic relative efficiency (A.R.E.) ofFriedman’sx _r ² -tests with respect to the classical analysis of variance test has been studied byElteren andNoether andSen [1967]. The present note extends these results to the case of correlated errors arising in some random-effects or mixed-effects models. Work supported by the U.S. Army Research Office, Durham, Grant DA-ARO-D-31-124-G 746.     

Goodness-of-fit test with nuisance regression and scale

In the linear model Y _i = x _i + e _i, i=1,,n, with unknown (, ), {\open R}^p, >0, and with i.i.d. errors e ₁,,e _n having a continuous distribution F, we test for the goodness-of-fit hypothesis H ₀:F(e)F ₀(e/), for a specified symmetric distribution F ₀, not necessarily normal. Even the finite sample null distribution of the proposed test criterion is independent of unknown (,), and the asymptotic null distribution is normal, as well as the distribution under local (contiguous) alternatives. The proposed tests are consistent against a general class of (nonparametric) alternatives, including the case of F having heavier (or lighter) tails than F ₀. A simulation study illustrates a good performance of the tests. Received July 2001