The value of tax benefits and the cost of liquidating versus selling failed thrift institutions

This paper examines the 205 insolvent thrifts that were resolved in 1988 and assesses the cost savings obtained by selling 179 of the institutions through assisted acquisitions rather than liquidating them. It is hypothesized that the cost savings were determined by factors related both to the future viability of the acquired institution and the particulars of the deal arranged by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The added value by selling a thrift is determined primarily by the level of core deposits obtained by the acquired thrift. However, the branch structure and purchased mortgage-servicing rights should also add franchise value to the firm. In addition to these factors, the analysis accounts for the tax benefits and other regulator forbearances associated with the deals. Other characteristics of the deals are also considered. It is found that core deposits, tax benefits, purchased mortgage-servicing rights, average branch size, and type of acquirer, as well as some other factors, were significant determinants of the cost savings obtained through selling an institution rather than liquidating it.     

Market penetration by entry-exit dynamics

A generic characterization of the dynamics of market penetration by technological artifacts is here formulated on the basis of entry rate and exit rate considerations. It is shown that low-order reductions lead to the biologically based logistic dynamic, which—by empirical fit—has been found to be in very good agreement with numerous specific cases. In addition to the derivational justification of the logistic for artifact market penetration, we find that but a small number of parameters are involved in these autonomous characterizations suggesting therefore that market penetration may well be reduced to a similarly small number of dominant operative processes. Some nonautonomous extensions are also discussed.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Some economics of content protection

We are grateful to a perceptive referee for many constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper entitled The Economics of Content Protection: A Dual Approach. The usual disclaimer applies.