EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS, FIRM SIZE, AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF STOCK PRICES

The notion that prices impound a wide array of information, including market expectations, has led to earnings forecast models conditioned on prices. Yet, presumably, analysts' forecasts capture both public information and certain private information not previously impounded in prices. Accordingly, price-based models are seemingly an inefficient, and less effective, source of expecta-tions. This article investigates this hypothesis using financial analysts', price-based, and naive forecasts. Results indicate that analysts' forecasts (1) are at least as accurate as price-based and naive models, and (2) yield better expectations for market tests relating returns and earnings. These inferences are robust across different information environments. The evidence suggests that analysts either possess private information or are more effective information processors, or both.     

Market penetration by entry-exit dynamics

A generic characterization of the dynamics of market penetration by technological artifacts is here formulated on the basis of entry rate and exit rate considerations. It is shown that low-order reductions lead to the biologically based logistic dynamic, which—by empirical fit—has been found to be in very good agreement with numerous specific cases. In addition to the derivational justification of the logistic for artifact market penetration, we find that but a small number of parameters are involved in these autonomous characterizations suggesting therefore that market penetration may well be reduced to a similarly small number of dominant operative processes. Some nonautonomous extensions are also discussed.     

Some economics of content protection

We are grateful to a perceptive referee for many constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper entitled The Economics of Content Protection: A Dual Approach. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Individual rights and organizational theory

Rights are very important concepts in everyday life. And they are especially important to participants in organizations. Yet, our theories of organization and management have largely ignored rights — stressing, instead, other concepts, such as goals, roles, etc. This article describes the historical significance of rights and their relevance in understanding social behavior. The advantages of a right-based organizational theory (versus traditional goal-based theories) are discussed.This article draws on the author's forthcoming book,A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).