Calvin's Reformation in Geneva: Self and Social Signalling

As Weber ( 1904 ) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predestination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that individuals belong to the “elect” and are therefore likely to behave well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an institution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals' behavior, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions affect levels of cooperation and coordination.     

Designing a Basic Income System with a Social Welfare Function

There is an irreducible conflict between, on the one hand, the desire to allocate income in society in an equitable way and, on the other, the desire to alleviate poverty. The conflict materializes itself in the problem of designing a basic income (or negative income tax) system which requires formulating a workable compromise. This paper approaches the problem through solving a mathematical program whose utility‐based objective function explicitly embodies both considerations. The solution describes a simple basic income system and its comparative statics indicate how the specification of the objective function leads to a more, or less, pro‐poor solution.