Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

This paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. We apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one-shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives, both framed in a similar way. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games, aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable. The pure or mixed Nash equilibria cannot describe subjects' behaviour. We present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion. While previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given, we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well. The global-game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players, given the observed distribution of actions. We also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities.     

Risk‐Adjusting the Returns to Venture Capital

We adapt stochastic discount factor (SDF) valuation methods for venture capital (VC) performance evaluation. Our approach generalizes the popular Public Market Equivalent (PME) method and allows statistical inference in the presence of cross‐sectionally dependent, skewed VC payoffs. We relax SDF restrictions implicit in the PME so that the SDF can accurately reflect risk‐free rates and returns of public equity markets during the sample period. This generalized PME yields substantially different abnormal performance estimates for VC funds and start‐up investments, especially in times of strongly rising public equity markets and for investments with betas far from one.     

Estimation and Evaluation of Conditional Asset Pricing Models

We find that several recently proposed consumption‐based models of stock returns, when evaluated using an optimal set of managed portfolios and the associated model‐implied conditional moment restrictions, fail to capture key features of risk premiums in equity markets. To arrive at these conclusions, we construct an optimal Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for models in which the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is a conditionally affine function of a set of priced risk factors, and we show that there is an optimal choice of managed portfolios to use in testing a null model against a proposed alternative generalized SDF.     

Interpreting Factor Models

We argue that tests of reduced‐form factor models and horse races between “characteristics” and “covariances” cannot discriminate between alternative models of investor beliefs. Since asset returns have substantial commonality, absence of near‐arbitrage opportunities implies that the stochastic discount factor can be represented as a function of a few dominant sources of return variation. As long as some arbitrageurs are present, this conclusion applies even in an economy in which all cross‐sectional variation in expected returns is caused by sentiment. Sentiment‐investor demand results in substantial mispricing only if arbitrageurs are exposed to factor risk when taking the other side of these trades.     

Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble

This paper documents that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the technology bubble. Instead, they were heavily invested in technology stocks. This does not seem to be the result of unawareness of the bubble: Hedge funds captured the upturn, but, by reducing their positions in stocks that were about to decline, avoided much of the downturn. Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.     

Sizing Up Repo

To understand which short‐term debt markets experienced “runs” during the financial crisis, we analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between nonbank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset‐backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset‐backed securities as well as the contraction in asset‐backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately affected a few dealer banks.