Dynamic lot sizing problem with continuous-time Markovian production cost

This paper develops a polynomial algorithm for obtaining dynamic economic lot sizes in a single product multiperiod production system with the objective of minimizing total production and inventory costs over T periods. It is assumed that production costs are linear, inventory costs are concave, setup costs are zero and backlogging is not permitted in all periods. Moreover, the unit production cost is a stochastic variable, which is evolved according to a continuous-time Markov process over the planning horizon. The model is formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming (DP) optimization with the state variable being unit production cost. Then, it is solved using the backward dynamic programming approach. To justify the application of the proposed model, two practical cases are presented.     

Audit Firm Tenure and Audit Quality in a Constrained Market

We examine the relation between audit quality and audit firm tenure in the Iranian audit market, which is constrained by government policies that create intense competition for clients among many small audit firms. We develop arguments that these circumstances create cost pressures that entrench low audit quality and render auditors' plans more predictable to managers wishing to misstate their accounts. Using publicly available data for the audits of listed companies in Iran prior to mandatory audit firm rotation and the incidence of misstated financial reports identified by the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants Inspection Office, we find that the likelihood of a misstatement is lowest in the first two years of audit firm tenure. We also find that the likelihood of misstatement is not associated with the year preceding a mandatory audit firm rotation, suggesting outgoing auditor effort is not sensitive to the prospect of subsequent revelations of deficiencies. Although our results from a pre-mandatory rotation period show that frequent rotations appear to improve the financial reporting quality in our sample, we are wary of interpreting these results as support for the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in Iran. Rather, we suggest this is a peculiar consequence of deficiencies in audit quality inherent in the Iranian market.     

UNIFORM TECHNICAL PROGRESS: CAN IT BE HARMFUL?

Abstract.  In a model incorporating trade in final goods, intermediate goods and capital, we show how 'uniform' technical progress across sectors can lead to immiserization. The condition for immiserizing technical progress crucially depends on the pattern of specialization. Our results tend to hold in a more general specification of the basic structure.     

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer’s responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.     

Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?

We study how natural resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive effect of natural resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data from more than 90 countries covering the period 1984–2004, we find evidence that natural resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is significantly mitigated by political decentralization.     

Exogenous information and input-output updating: An evaluation

Input-output coefficients' intertemporal instability, costs, and time lags involved in the construction of survey-based tables necessitate employment of nonsurvey updating techniques. Analysts, however, may want to include exogenous information in the updating process. The issue, then, is whether this inclusion ameliorates or aggravates the results. This paper attempts to assess the wisdom of incorporating exogenous information into the updating procedure. First, using the naive, RAS, and LaGrangian techniques, the 1966 table of the former Soviet Union was updated to 1972. Next, treating the top 10 percent largest 1972 coefficients as exogenous estimates, the remaining coefficients were updated via the same three methods. Comparison of the results indicates that exogenous determination of the largest coefficients does not change the methods' rankings while yielding substantial improvements in the forecasts. This paper was presented at the Forty-Sixth International Atlantic Economic Conference, Boston, MA, October 8–11, 1998.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,NON‐TRADED GOODS AND REAL WAGES

Using a three‐sector general equilibrium model with non‐traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions.     

What Drives TBL Reporting: Good Governance or Threat to Legitimacy?

This paper provides two complementary explanations for the adoption of triple bottom line (TBL) reporting by Australian companies. The first explanation is that companies adopt TBL reporting to legitimise their relationship with society because of adverse publicity from the media. The second explanation is that TBL reporting is adopted because of the company's desire to achieve high‐quality reporting and transparency inferred by strong corporate governance. Companies with TBL reporting had significantly more adverse media coverage before implementing TBL reporting than non‐TBL companies. TBL reporting is also significantly and positively related to the existence of an environmental or sustainable development committee and the frequency of meetings of the audit committee.