R&D Investments and Tax Incentives: The Role of Intra-Firm Cross-Border Collaboration*

U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra-firm, cross-border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross-border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross-border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax-efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.     

Measuring rural consumers’ willingness to pay for quality labels using experimental auctions: the case of aflatoxin‐free maize in Kenya

Aflatoxins are a common health hazard in tropical countries, especially in rural areas. New methods to reduce aflatoxin levels in food staples, as well as cheaper test methods, are being developed, but consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for these improvements is unknown. A survey was conducted with a representative sample of rural consumers (1,344 in total, 63% women) in all major maize‐production zones of Kenya. The survey included an experimental auction with maize products of different qualities. The results showed that many rural consumers were aware of aflatoxins, but few understood their health risks. Respondents were willing to pay a premium for maize tested for aflatoxins and labeled, but asked a high discount for maize that was visibly contaminated with moldy grain. The premium was higher for respondents with education and in regions with aflatoxicosis outbreaks. Knowledge of aflatoxins substantially reduced the overall WTP, but did not increase the WTP for tested maize. Welfare analysis indicates that mandatory testing would result in substantial benefits if the cost of testing can be lowered to below the premium.     

Telecom reforms in the EU: Prices and consumers' satisfaction

The paper shows the impact of privatization and liberalization on consumers in the telecommunication sector for 15 EU countries. Policy reforms are summarized by the OECD regulatory indicators (REGREF) that consider the extent of privatization, vertical disintegration, and market entry. After controlling for other country variables, first, a test of the impact of ownership and regulatory changes on consumer prices is given. In the second step, the Eurobarometer data on consumers' satisfaction about quality and prices of the telecommunication service are considered. The analysis confirms the importance of market regulation in reducing prices but minimizes the role played by privatization per se. Overall, the findings offer only mixed evidence, and somehow contradict, the hypothesis that all the reforms work in a similar way across the EU countries.     

Anticipatory algorithms for same-day courier dispatching

This paper describes anticipatory algorithms for the dynamic vehicle dispatching problem with pickups and deliveries, a problem faced by local area courier companies. These algorithms evaluate alternative solutions through a short-term demand sampling and a fully sequential procedure for indifference zone selection. They also exploit an unified and integrated approach in order to address all the issues involved in real-time fleet management, namely assigning requests to vehicles, routing the vehicles, scheduling the routes and relocating idle vehicles. Computational results show that the anticipatory algorithms provide consistently better solutions than their reactive counterparts.     

Perpetual Leapfrogging in Bertrand Duopoly

We consider different patterns of infinite technological adoption choices by firms in a Bertrand duopoly. Every period technological progress provides a sequence of cost reducing innovations. The equilibrium concept is Markov perfect equilibrium. We analyze conditions for which equilibrium adoption leads to persistent leadership and those where firms alternate in adoption inducing leapfrogging. Only leapfrogging leads to technological improvement in the long run. Demand conditions play a crucial role in determining whether leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand duopoly.     

Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments

In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model.We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones—regardless whether interaction neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both structures. We find that with some interaction neighbourhoods even the opposite may hold.     

Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong (“explosive”) effect of even small toeholds. While asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring.