排序方式: 共有6条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Edward P. Kahn Michael H. Rothkopf Joseph H. Eto Jean-Michel Nataf 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》1990,2(2):129-149
Competition was introduced into the electric utility industry with the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978. Increasing interest has appeared in structuring the PURPA purchase market into an auction system. This paper addresses the design issues associated with setting up such markets and introduces a simulation model to study them. The simulation analysis is guided by theoretical issues such as the alleged inefficiency of first-price auctions. We find that efficiency concerns raised about first-price auctions turn out to be less important than simple theoretical concerns would suggest. 相似文献
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Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Hobbs Benjamin F. Rothkopf Michael H. Hyde Laurel C. O'Neill Richard P. 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2000,18(1):5-32
We describe a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction for supply and demand bidding in the face of market power and nonconcave benefits in which bidders are motivated to bid truthfully, and evaluate its use for power and gas pipeline capacity auctions. The auction efficiently allocate resources if firms maximize profit. Simulations, including an application to the PJM power market, illustrate the procedure. However, the auction has several undesirable properties. It risks being revenue deficient, can be gamed by cooperating suppliers and consumers, and is subject to the information revelation and bid-taker cheating concerns that make single item Vickrey auctions rare. 相似文献
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Ernan Haruvy Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc Octavian Carare James C. Cox Eric A. Greenleaf Wolfgang Jank Sandy Jap Young-Hoon Park Michael H. Rothkopf 《Marketing Letters》2008,19(3-4):431-448
Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical, and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions. 相似文献
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Amar Cheema Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc Rajesh Bagchi Richard P. Bagozzi James C. Cox Utpal M. Dholakia Eric A. Greenleaf Amit Pazgal Michael H. Rothkopf Michael Shen Shyam Sunder Robert Zeithammer 《Marketing Letters》2005,16(3-4):401-413
With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic,
social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior
in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models
of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms.
This paper is based on the special session at the 6th Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, University of Colorado Boulder,
June 2004 (co-chaired by the first two authors). 相似文献
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