On the strategic inconsistency of the meta-rights approach

Among many attempts to circumvent Sen's impossibility result Gibbard's theory of alienable rights has attracted attention of many researchers. Basu's (1984) theorem essentially depends on a Nash-type equilibrium concept. In this paper we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption where individuals have conjectures about the responses of others and investigate the robustness of Basu's result under this new solution concept. We also examine a possibility of coalition formation and cooperation under the meta-rights approach.For helpful discussions I would like to thank Rajat Deb, Joseph Greenberg, and Shlomo Weber. I am also indebted to an anonymous referee of this Journal for many valuable comments.     

On the impossibility of an envy-free Paretian liberal

This paper examines a close parallel between the theory of fairness and Harel and Nitzan's original definition of non-exchangeable rights system. Several independent definitions of fair rights assignment are proposed, and some new impossibility as well as possibility results are established.For helpful discussions I would like to thank Rajat Deb, Shlomo Weber and Hans Wiesmeth. I am also indebted to two anonymous referees of thisJournal for their valuable comments.     

On the inconsistency of a weak version of the libertarian principle

It is shown that even granting weak group rights will sometimes result in a conflict with such a widely acceptable efficiency criterion as the Pareto principle. On the other hand, if we strengthen the decesive power of groups, this may lead to a conflict even with the weak non-imposition condition, provided that a social choice function satisfies a rather mild choice-consistency property.     

Freedom, opportunity and uncertainty: A logical approach

The paper explores the possibility of analyzing opportunities within a logical framework. We make clear how a person's freedom in different choice situations yield opportunity rankings by showing how such rankings are completely determined by subjacent logical chains. We explore one interpretation of such chains in particular, and show that it leads to results similar to those obtained earlier by Nehring and Puppe. Furthermore, for contexts in which not all of the consequences of one's acts are known, we present an alternative characterization of the leximin-ranking.