排序方式: 共有13条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible “prizes” are determined by the status quo and some new public policy proposal. In this paper we study a general class of such two‐player public policy contests and examine the effect of a change in the proposed policy, a change that may affect the payoffs of the two contestants, on their effort and performance. Our results extend the existing comparative statics studies that focus, in symmetric contests, on the effect of a change in the value of the prize or, in asymmetric contests, on the effect of one contestant's valuation of the prize. Our results hinge on a fundamental equation that specifies the equilibrium relationship between the strategic own‐stake effect and the strategic rival's‐stake effect. This fundamental equation clarifies the role of the three possible types of ability and stake asymmetry in determining the effect of payoff variations on the efforts and performance of the contestants. 相似文献
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JOYCE EPSTEIN 《International Journal of Consumer Studies》1980,4(1):51-60
This a continuation of a paper which appeared in the last issue of the Journal of Consumer Studies and Home Economics. The first part of the paper dealt with studies of consumer representation, particularly in the nationalized industries (which show its weaknesses and inadequacy); with studies of information and education (which show the limited usefulness and slow progress of each); and with work done on the real needs of consumers (which shows the deep uncertainties which exist about what those real needs are). Here five further topics of consumer research are considered and suggestions are made for future research. 相似文献
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Learning Under Ambiguity 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper considers learning when the distinction between risk and ambiguity matters. It first describes thought experiments, dynamic variants of those provided by Ellsberg, that highlight a sense in which the Bayesian learning model is extreme—it models agents who are implausibly ambitious about what they can learn in complicated environments. The paper then provides a generalization of the Bayesian model that accommodates the intuitive choices in the thought experiments. In particular, the model allows decision-makers' confidence about the environment to change—along with beliefs—as they learn. A portfolio choice application compares the effect of changes in confidence under ambiguity vs. changes in estimation risk under Bayesian learning. The former is shown to induce a trend towards more stock market participation and investment even when the latter does not. 相似文献
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LARRY G. EPSTEIN 《The Review of economic studies》2006,73(2):413-436
This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behaviour when formulating plans. Gul and Pesendorfer's theory of temptation and self-control is a key building block. The main result is a representation theorem that generalizes (the dynamic version of) Anscombe–Aumann's theorem so that both the prior and the way in which it is updated are subjective. The model can accommodate updating biases analogous to those observed by psychologists. 相似文献
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In a contest of group‐specific public goods we consider the effect that managing an interest group has on the rent dissipation and the total expected payoffs of the contest. While in the first group there is a central planner determining its members’ expenditure in the contest, in the second group there are two different possibilities: either all the members are governed by a central planner or they are not. We consider both types of contests: an all‐pay auction and a Logit contest success function. We show that while governing an interest group decreases free‐riding, it may as well decrease the rent dissipation; at the same time the expected payoffs of the groups may also decrease. 相似文献
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